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The goal of this thesis is to predict participation in groundwater trading and the 
directions of trades among participants. Specifically, the paper considers both formal and 
informal trading of groundwater used for crop irrigation purposes and attempts to identify 
those characteristics that predict the probability of trade participation and whether an 
individual is a buyer or seller of groundwater rights. While the public benefits from 
efficient use of groundwater include adequate stream flow in hydrologically connected 
areas and future use of groundwater supplies, there are significant private benefits to 
landowners especially in water-short areas. Groundwater trading can help move water 
from low-value to high-value areas of use for the benefit of the participating traders and 
general public.  
Previous research on water trading has focused on surface water trading and 
theoretical approaches to analyzing groundwater trading. Empirical analysis of 
groundwater trading is a relatively new area of study due in part to the previous lack of 
recorded usage, trade data and binding constraints on groundwater use by landowners. 
Results from this research indicate a strong desire to participate in trades, but high 
transactions costs have limited the number of trades that have occurred.  Utilizing 
empirical models improves the accuracy of predicting trade participation and direction, 
and therefore the accuracy of models of trade effects on water supplies and stream flows 
used in policy and decision making.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Water is one of the most important natural resource on Earth as it is needed for, 
but not limited to, drinking, bathing, and the production of food. The use of water for 
agricultural irrigation is directly responsible for food reaching the dinner table every 
night. Without irrigation, much of the Western United States would be unable to produce 
the quantity and quality of crops that have become associated with those regions.  
 According to United States Geological Survey (USGS) data, in 2005 nearly 85 
percent of the withdrawals and 74 percent of the irrigated acres were located in the 17 
most western states, where the average annual rainfall is less than 20 inches (United 
States Geological Survey, 2012).  While Nebraska ranks fourth in the volume of water 
applied, it leads the nation in the number of acres under irrigation at approximately 8.56 
million acres. On average, Nebraska receives 22.9 inches of precipitation each year. The 
southeastern corner receives the highest amount (30.1-35 inches) while moving to the far 
western side of the state, and the area of interest for this research, receives only 15.1-20 
inches annually (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2005).  This limited rainfall during the 
growing season in the western portion of Nebraska results in the high use of irrigation 
systems to produce grain crops like corn and wheat, which require about 22 inches of 
rainfall a growing season to reach high yielding maturity (Corn, Water Requirements, 
2008).  
The primary source of the water used for irrigation is pulled from groundwater 
wells over the High Plains Aquifer that are often hydrologically connected to the many 
rivers and watersheds located in the state. According to the Nebraska Department of 
Natural Resources Well Registry Database, as of May 2012 there were over 122,000 
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wells registered for use for irrigation. Over 80 percent of the acres irrigated in Nebraska 
are done so using sprinkler systems, which provide higher water-use efficiency over 
gravity or flood irrigation systems. Nearly all of the sprinkler systems utilize center pivot 
technology with an estimated 55,000 systems used on over 77 percent of the irrigated 
acres (Johnson, Thompson, Giri, & Van NewKirk, 2011). 
 
Republican River Compact 
 The Republican River Compact is a legal agreement supported by the Federal 
Government between the three states where the Republican River flows: Colorado, 
Nebraska and Kansas. The motivation behind the compact was two-fold: first, a 
prolonged drought during the 1930s followed by a devastating flood in 1935 inspired 
concern about water usage, and second the need to distribute proper shares of the water 
before the federal development and funding of flood prevention projects could be started. 
Starting in 1940, governor-appointed representatives from the three states met to begin 
discussing how to appropriate the waters of the Republican River above the connection of 
the Republican and Smoky Hill Rivers in Kansas. By March of 1941, the representatives 
had signed and submitted a proposed compact to Congress. The three state legislatures 
had ratified the proposed compact and Congress approved and sent the compact for 
President Roosevelt’s consent. He vetoed the compact due to objections from federal 
agencies; another bill was passed that called for further negotiations with a federal 
representative involved. A few changes were made to fulfill the federal government 
requirements, but they had no impact on the previously agreed-to allocations of water 
between the states. This second compact was then signed by the state representatives, 
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submitted, and approved by each state legislatures and Congress, and was approved by 
the President in 1943 (Republican River Water Conservation District, 2005). 
 The six major goals of the Compact are to: (1) provide for the most efficient use 
of the waters in the Republican River Basin for multiple purposes; (2) provide for an 
equitable division of such waters; (3) remove all causes, present and future, which might 
lead to controversies; (4) promote interstate comity; (5) recognize that the most efficient 
utilization of the waters within the Basin is for beneficial consumptive use;  and (6) 
promote joint action by the states and the United States in the efficient use of water and 
the control of destructive floods (United States Congress, 1942). 
 The Compact (1943) outlines the watershed area that is involved in the 
agreement— approximately 24,900 square miles—as “all the area in Colorado, Kansas, 
and Nebraska, which is naturally drained by the Republican River, and its tributaries, to 
its junction with the Smoky Hill River in Kansas.” The Republican River begins in the 
high plains of northeastern Colorado and flows generally eastward before joining the 
Smoky Hill River and forming the Kansas River that drains into the Missouri River. The 
Compact also defines beneficial consumptive use as “that use by which the water supply 
of the Basin is consumed through activities of man, and shall include water consumed by 
evaporation from any reservoir, canal, ditch, or irrigated area.” A map of the area of 
interest is available in the appendix as Figure A.1. 
 Article IV of the Compact outlines each state’s total allocation for beneficial 
consumptive use and the quantities that are physically available from particular portions 
of the River. Colorado is allocated 54,100 acre-feet of water annually; Kansas receives 
190,300 acre-feet of water annually; and Nebraska is allowed to use 234,500 acre-feet of 
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water annually. The Compact also allows public water officials from each state to 
administer the Compact; in 1959, the three officials organized themselves into the 
Republican River Compact Administration (RRCA). 
 For nearly 40 years the Compact existed with few disagreements among the 
states. However, in the 1980’s Kansas began to advocate for the regulation of 
groundwater use in connection with the Compact. After failing to reach an agreement 
within the RRCA, Kansas filed a complaint to the U.S. Supreme Court on May 26, 1998, 
that claimed the State of Nebraska had violated the Compact “by allowing the 
proliferation and use of thousands of wells hydraulically connected to the Republican 
Rivers and its tributaries, but the failure to protect surface flows from unauthorized 
appropriation by Nebraska users, and by other acts and omissions.” (State of Kansas v. 
State of Nebraska and State of Colorado, 1998) The lawsuit was accepted by the Supreme 
Court and became known as Kansas v. Nebraska and Colorado, No. 126 Original. 
Colorado was included in the lawsuit because the Republican River’s origin is within that 
state and it is a member of the Compact.  
 In June of 1999, Nebraska was allowed to file a Motion to Dismiss upon the 
premise that the Compact did not specifically mention groundwater, and therefore 
groundwater cannot be restricted or included in the allocation for beneficial consumptive 
use. Kansas argued the opposite, that all groundwater should be included in the 
computation of the virgin water supply and consumptive use. Colorado offered an 
intermediate position that alluvial ground water should be included in the allocation, but 
not wells located on the tablelands that pump from the High Plains Aquifer. The Supreme 
Court appointed Special Master McKusick to receive oral arguments from the three 
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states. After careful review of all presented testimony and documents, Special Master 
McKusick denied Nebraska’s Motion to Dismiss and concluded that both upland wells 
and alluvial wells are to be included if they deplete stream flow. The ruling that all 
sources of groundwater were to be included in the allocation system motivated the states 
to begin mediation with three members representing each state. The Final Settlement 
Stipulation was presented and approved by Special Master McKusick on December 15, 
2002.  
 The Final Settlement Stipulation contained the following agreements: (1) forever 
waive all claims against each other that related to the use of water in the Republican 
River prior to December 15, 2002; (2) form a committee composed of representatives 
from each state to construct a comprehensive ground water model to determine the 
amount, timing, and location of depletions from groundwater pumping that accrue to the 
Republican River and its tributaries by July 1, 2003; (3) moratorium on the construction 
of new wells, specifically in Nebraska to match existing moratoriums in Kansas and 
Colorado; (4) numerous clarifications and accounting improvements that will assist the 
RRCA in administration of the Compact; (5) establish specific procedures to encourage 
the resolution of disputes, including binding arbitration; and (6) commitments to future 
joint efforts to maximize the beneficial consumptive use of water. 
  Responsibility for Nebraska’s compliance with the new Final Settlement 
Stipulations falls upon the individual Natural Resource Districts (NRD) within the Basin 
and the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (DNR). The NRDs are responsible 
for identifying and certifying the number of acres being irrigated by each groundwater 
well. To accurately measure the amount of groundwater used, each well needs to be 
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metered and allocations enforced so that data from each meter is accurate. The NRDs are 
currently working with the DNR to create and implement integrated management plans 
that will help with compliance issues. The NRD is again responsible for enforcing the 
management plan and, alongside the DNR, is charged with the collection of accurate data 
to provide the greatest possible accuracy for the RRCA’s Republican River Groundwater 
Model’s determination of allocation rights to each state in the Compact. 
 
Upper Republican Natural Resource District 
 The Upper Republican Natural Resource District (URNRD) covers the three 
counties in the far southwest corner of Nebraska: Perkins, Chase and Dundy (see Figure 
A.2 in the appendix). The total land area is 2,697 square miles, with a population of 8,944 
in 2010 (United States Census Bureau, 2012). The majority of the land is used for grain 
production and cattle ranching.  Land used for grain production is either irrigated to 
produce corn, soybeans or wheat or used for dryland production of wheat and edible 
beans. The URNRD has a total of 3,179 active irrigation wells servicing a total of 
452,395 certified acres (Palazzo & Brozovic, 2012).  
 As a result of the Final Settlement Stipulation of 2002 regarding the Republican 
River Compact, the URNRD jointly developed an Integrated Management Plan (IMP) 
with the Nebraska DNR to promote compliance and further reduction in groundwater 
usage. The Final Settlement Stipulation and resulting changes had a profound effect on 
the Nebraska portion of the Basin, as indicated above. Unlike the Middle Republican, 
Lower Republican and Tri-Basin NRDs, the URNRD had been certifying irrigation 
acreage and actively monitoring all wells using meters prior to the dispute between states. 
Starting in 1978, the URNRD has been actively involved in the management of the 
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groundwater resources within the district through the adoption and enforcement of rules 
and regulations. Along with monitoring pumping from each well, the URNRD has 
established correlative irrigation allocation rights. Since the first allocation limits were 
established in 1983, the annual irrigation allocation has decreased from 20 inches per 
year to the current allocation of 13 inches per year. These allocations are issued as an 
aggregate amount to be allocated over five years. Groundwater right holders are then 
allowed to carry forward the unused portion of their allocation, together with any unused 
portions from previous years, into succeeding allocation periods. The most recent 
allocation periods were 2005-2007 and 2008-2012. The first was only three years due to a 
reduction in the allocation after the first two years of a five-year period. The URNRD 
also allows for the pooling of well-specific allocations into an aggregate allocation for 
groups of wells owned by the same person, partnerships, corporations, or other 
individuals, subject to a signed agreement.  
 The amount of carry forward recorded in the URNRD indicates that most of the 
groundwater users are not fully constrained and are able to pump enough to produce a 
high yielding crop while staying below the restricted allocation. However, one of the 
2010 IMP objectives is to further reduce groundwater use in the URNRD by 20 percent 
from the 1998-2002 baseline pumping volumes under average precipitation conditions. 
The goal of the objective is to help the district and state stay in compliance with the 
Compact according to the RRCA Groundwater Model. (Nebraska DNR and the Upper 
Republican NRD, 2010). 
Through ongoing revisions to the rules and regulations, the URNRD has 
developed a new system that better incorporates the hydrological effect of pools and 
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restricts the pooling and trading distance to that of a floating township or 36 square miles. 
The URNRD also has established a moratorium on new wells within the District and has 
established procedures for monitoring the quality of the aquifer underlying the District.  
Most important to this research is the portion of the rules pertaining to the transfer of the 
groundwater allocation rights assigned to each well. The current trading process utilizes 
administrative rules designed to help the District remain in compliance, take into 
consideration the hydraulic connectivity of the wells, and minimize third-party 
externalities that may exist. The downfall of the current system is that it is time-
consuming and results in high transaction costs limiting the amount of beneficial transfers 
that could have occurred. However, 35 transfers, involving 100 fields, have occurred 
since 2006, indicating the demand for a water trading market within the District. (Upper 
Republican NRD, 2010).  
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1.1 Objectives 
 The primary objective of this research is to understand how well hydroeconomic 
models can predict actual trading participation and behavior. The research focuses on the 
URNRD and breaks the data into six groups to model participation and direction of 
formal permanent trades, as well as participation and direction for informal trades during 
the two most recent allocation periods. Formal trading is defined as the permanent 
transfer of allocation acres as approved by the URNRD board. We define informal trades 
as the temporary transfer of water use within a pool, as determined by the difference 
between the individual field’s use and the pool’s average use during an allocation period.  
The results from these models will be important for ex-ante evaluation of groundwater 
trading in other regions. 
 
1.2 Organization  
 The organization of this document is intended to guide the reader through the 
research problem by outlining the motivation and background through Chapter 1. Chapter 
2 identifies pervious literature relevant to water trading markets and a theoretical 
foundation for proceeding with an empirical model. Chapter 3 outlines the data used and 
the methodology of probit binary regression models used for the analysis.  The results of 
each of the models is presented and discussed in Chapter 4.  The final remarks and 
conclusions draw the research to a close and are found in Chapter 5.   
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The previous literature on water markets have primarily focused on surface water 
trading, but interest in developing markets for groundwater trading has begun to increase 
in recent years.  The majority of surface water rights in the western US, including surface 
water rights in Nebraska, are issued under an appropriation doctrine of “first in time, first 
in right.” This idea implies that the earliest issued rights are considered to be senior rights 
and the newest rights are referred to as junior rights. If there is a shortage of water along 
with an increased demand—usually from drought or drought-like conditions—those with 
more junior rights are forced to cut back or stop use of the water until the water source 
reaches the maximum diversion or pumping allowance. Some regions, such as Texas, 
choose to apply the right to capture or use the water under the land you own when 
allocating groundwater rights. The landowners do not own the water beneath their 
property, but simply have the right to pump and capture whatever water is available, 
regardless of the effects of that pumping on neighboring wells. 
Groundwater rights in Nebraska utilize the correlative rights doctrine that is 
administered by the local NRD. The correlative rights doctrine ties all appropriated water 
rights together and assigns equal priority to all rights. This idea implies that when a 
shortage in groundwater within a NRD has been triggered, all groundwater-rights holders 
within that NRD have their allocation, or supply, decreased proportionally.  In order to 
meet certain policy goals regarding the amount of total water used and its impact on the 
aquifer and surrounding water bodies, the NRDs (under state supervision) can control the 
amount of water pumped, or the total number of irrigated acres, or a combination of the 
two. Each NRD is allowed to specify the exact terms of the groundwater rights and most 
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choose to use a combination approach that registers the amount of certified irrigation 
acres and then allocates pumping rights that restrict the amount of water that can be used 
over a 3-5 year period.  
Water trading markets face some unique issues that are not present in other 
resource markets, such as markets for land and mineral deposits. The use of groundwater 
from an aquifer lies between a completely nonexclusive resource (such as the ocean 
fisheries) and an exclusive resource (such as the harvest of privately owned timber). 
Because of this distinctive property of water, much literature has been written exploring 
the possibility of market transactions as a more efficient allocation method and discussing 
the possible negative impacts and concerns of water markets. 
Defining water as a tradable resource can be difficult due to the nonstandard 
nature of the commodity. Scientists have determined that water can neither be created nor 
destroyed, but cycles through the Earth’s hydrological cycle. Freshwater is necessary to 
sustain human and plant life outside of the oceans, and the quantity of usable freshwater 
is at the core of the majority of water policy.  Quantity of water is a major component of 
considerations of water as a commodity and is often calculated as a stock, not as it 
naturally occurs as precipitation and flows. An important note is that not all water use is 
consumptive, such as hydropower generation. Complicating the situation further is that 
precipitation and flows vary significantly over time due to weather patterns, and the 
availability of water directly influences the value of the water. Of particular importance 
for surface water trading is that water is bulky and incompressible, resulting in expensive 
storage and transportation. To minimize the third-party impacts and transaction costs, the 
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nonstandard nature of water requires special consideration when constructing the 
institutions that will manage the water rights market (Chong & Sunding, 2006). 
2.1 Necessary Elements to Establish a Water Market 
The general requirements for a competitive market system include: 1) many 
sellers and buyers with full knowledge of the market institutions and facing similar 
transaction costs; 2) participation decisions are made independent from other buyers and 
sellers; 3) outcomes are not affected by the decisions of other participants; and 4) 
participants are assumed to be maximizing profits. Market systems that have met these 
requirements will move resources from low value uses to high value uses, resulting in an 
economically efficient allocation of resources for both individuals and society. Because 
markets move water from low value to high value by allowing compensation for the 
water sold, they provide an incentive for more efficient use of water and reduce the stress 
on the water supply from high value uses.  A well-designed water market requires the 
measurement and monitoring of water withdrawals, enforcement of withdrawal rules, and 
should consider any externalities or third party effects (Dinar, Rosegrant, & Meinzen-
Dick, 1997). 
Saliba (1987) evaluated five existing water markets in the Southwest and defined 
the transfer water rights as those rights which were sold on their own (not as part of a 
land transfer), with buyers and sellers participating voluntarily and using a negotiable 
price.  Many authors agree that the major element needed for a water market is 
completely specified, enforceable, and transferable property rights. When a water market 
is efficient, water will be transferred from uses that are lower value to uses that are 
considered to be of higher value, so long as the gains in value are large enough to offset 
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the costs of completing the transaction. When transaction costs are low, the price of water 
rights is similar among uses, such as agriculture, industrial, and urban. However, if high 
transaction costs persist, differences in marginal water values will continue to influence 
the market and the prices of water rights will vary between uses. Because detailed water 
rights are generally heterogeneous, transaction costs tend to be higher as buyers and 
sellers must engage in market searches that fulfill the institutional regulations on legal 
and hydrological characteristics of the water rights involved. High transaction costs 
reduce the level of profitable transactions but are not necessarily a sign of an inefficient 
market. High transaction costs that are the result of law and institutional requirements 
consider the impact of trades on third parties and the public interest which can be 
negatively impacted if ignored. Saliba (1987) concluded that water markets are in fact 
functioning well where the economic incentives for transfers outweigh the transaction 
costs involved and where the policies regarding markets are not costless, but are 
necessary. 
Howe, et al. (1986) identified six criteria that can be used to compare mechanisms 
of water allocation.  The first criterion is flexibility in the allocation of existing water 
supplies to allow water to be moved from use to use and from place to place as needs and 
information change. Flexibility to adjust to changes in demand allows a market to equate 
marginal values over many uses at the lowest costs. This does not require that all water 
be allowed to transfer, only that a tradable margin should exist within a water-using area. 
The second criterion involves the security of tenure for existing users, which motivates 
the users to invest in and maintain water diversion systems, promoting efficient resource 
use. Security does not conflict with flexibility as long as water right holders can 
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voluntarily respond to incentives for reallocating water. The allocation mechanism must 
also consider the real opportunity costs of the resource. This cost is paid by the users to 
internalize the other demand and externality effects, such as the impact on environmental 
uses with a non-market value. The predictability of the market process outcome is 
necessary to motivate participation in the market by reducing fear of uncertainty and 
minimizing the transaction costs. Equity and fairness of the market should be perceived 
by the public and water users should not impose uncompensated costs on other parties. 
This requires that those giving up water should be compensated, as should those injured 
by changes in points of diversion and return flows. Any mechanism must be politically 
and publicly acceptable and consider the values that may not be considered by the 
individual water users, such as water quality and in-stream flow maintenance. Evaluating 
the fulfillment of each of the six criteria, the authors argue that markets are superior to 
other allocation mechanisms in many situations and therefore are better suited to 
appropriately allocate water to achieve the optimal allocation (Howe, Schurmeier, & 
Shaw, Jr., 1986). 
The efficiency gains of water markets requires the allocation of private property 
rights which can only be accomplished if there is an efficient mechanism, such as a 
computer based market,  to allocate and trade the water rights. As technology continues 
to improve and the adoption of high-speed communication continues, computer-based 
water markets can better achieve the efficiency gains of allocating water to the highest-
value use than traditional institutional procedures that are slow and costly to change. 
Laboratory experiments by Murphy, et al. have shown that “smart,” computer-based 
markets provide the ability to incorporate the same allocation criteria used by regulators; 
15 
 
 
also, unlike other institutional systems of allocation, the prices discovered in the 
computer-based system provide information about the current state of the system and are 
better equipped to adapt to new information (Murphy, Dinar, Howitt, Rassenti, & Smith, 
2000). 
2.2 Benefits of Water Markets 
 In most Western states, water fees are based on diversion costs, which are only a 
partial valuation of the total value of the water. This has led the price of water to be 
artificially held below the market equilibrium price that would set marginal cost equal to 
marginal benefit. This artificially lower price has created excess demand for water at that 
price and has multiplied the scarcity issue of water. Multiple empirical studies have 
concluded that there exist negative demand elasticities and significant consumer 
responses to changes in water prices. In the standard economic analysis of all else equal, 
including the absence of institutional, social and legal restraints, these studies have shown 
that those with a greater ability to pay can attract water rights and that there is a 
negatively-sloped demand curve for water. By implementing a market system for water, 
the seriousness of the idea of total water scarcity is reduced and replaced by the idea that 
cheap water is indeed scarce (Brajer & Martin, 1989). 
 Under market conditions for water rights, the seller has an opportunity to increase 
profitability and the buyer benefits from the encouragement of water availability. Water 
markets also promote improved water management and efficiency, which can benefit the 
environment through reduced water-related pollution.  Water markets have also been 
shown to: empower water users by requiring consent and compensation, provide security 
of water rights, which encourages investment, encourage water users to consider the full 
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opportunity cost of water, and motivate users to consider the extent of the external costs 
imposed by their use. Water markets also provide flexibility as they can reflect the 
changes in crop prices, costs, and water values as demand patterns change (Dinar, 
Rosegrant, & Meinzen-Dick, 1997). 
2.3 Detriments of Markets 
 The formation and management of efficient water markets is not without 
significant obstacles. Along with identifying the necessary criteria for water market 
formation, Howe, et al. (1986) also examined four major shortcomings of water markets. 
The first is that water prices may fail to reflect full opportunity costs due to geographical 
limits and the omission of negative externalities. Unfortunately, markets are less 
predictable than allocations through long-term contracts or water use licensing, making it 
difficult to encourage participation. Water markets are typically designed to provide 
equity between buyer and seller, but run the risk of ignoring third parties that are 
negatively impacted. The market often understates public good values of instream flows 
and water quality. However, these issues can be addressed through institutional 
requirements that aim to minimize these effects (Howe, Schurmeier, & Shaw, Jr., 1986). 
It is important to consider the hydrological connectivity of the water involved in the 
markets, as transfers can negatively impact return flows and a third party. Externalities— 
such as changes downstream and return flows, pollution, overdraft of water tables, 
waterlogging, and other adverse environmental impacts—are the basis of most arguments 
against water markets. This is where efficiency and equity goals often conflict. Efficiency 
would say that these externalities should be included in the cost of the transfer, while 
equity would call for the compensation of those third parties impacted by the transfer. 
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Minimizing these potential negative impacts should be a goal for the state, basin and/or 
district governments in water markets for tradable rights (Dinar, Rosegrant, & Meinzen-
Dick, 1997). 
Chong and Sunding (2006) consider four current arguments against trading water, 
with the first being that water markets mean reallocation from agricultural to urban uses.  
While there are significant transfers of water from agriculture to urban sectors, the trades 
within the agriculture sector are also significant. This argument against market formation 
does not apply to the URNRD, as the urban population has been shrinking and is not 
allowed in the water trading market. 
The second argument is that the transfers result in large economic losses for areas of 
origin, which becomes a concern when trades are allowed outside of the basin (Chong & 
Sunding, 2006). Within the URNRD, the trades are restricted geographically to be within 
a floating township and must be within the district. This restriction, along with the fact 
that all trades are within the agricultural sector, eliminates the potential for this concern 
in the URNRD.  
The next argument is that interbasin trade should be prohibited because of large 
hydrologic effects (Chong & Sunding, 2006). Again, the geographic restriction within the 
URNRD helps minimize the hydrologic effects of trades and was designed to help 
minimize the impact of groundwater pumping on the flow of the Republican River. 
Understanding how the water is hydrologically connected is an important consideration 
when designing water markets because economic market theory promotes inter-state or 
inter-basin trades that have enough eligible participants and water available to motivate 
trade. There needs to be a balance that allows for a large trade area with enough 
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participants for the market to exist but with minimal third-party and externality impacts, 
which is made possible through an understanding of the area’s hydrology. 
The final argument is that water is a public good and should not be subject to market 
forces (Chong & Sunding, 2006). The majority of literature promotes the development of 
water markets under appropriate conditions with the idea of achieving the social optimum 
of economic efficiency. To address the concerns of the public value of water, appropriate 
and effective institutions need to be developed that recognize the public good qualities of 
water, incorporate appropriate transactions costs, and address externalities such as 
potential negative consequences of groundwater use on neighboring wells, on endangered 
aquatic species, on adjacent stream flow, and on the future of water supplies for growing 
populations (Palazzo & Brozovic, 2012). 
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CHAPTER 3: DATA SOURCES AND METHODS  
The data used in the analysis includes publicly available well data from the 
Nebraska DNR and proprietary data collected and provided by the URNRD.  
The Nebraska DNR well database for the Upper Republican NRD provided the 
starting point for analysis. It contains all wells within the geographic boundaries of the 
URNRD, including those used for domestic, livestock, and irrigation purposes.  The file 
also contains technical information on each well, including pump depth, pump rate, date 
of drilling, and the current status of the well. Specific geographic location information 
and well ownership information is also included within the file. There are 4,604 wells 
listed in the DNR database; however, only 3,274 are used for active irrigation after 
reconciling with the data provided by the URNRD.  
The URNRD provided many datasets to help analyze the trades within the district. 
An important dataset contained 126 records of formal allocation transfers of groundwater 
for irrigation beginning in 2006 and ending in 2011. This file was used to identify 35 
formal trades involving 100 unique field IDs and was verified using the allocation 
adjustment data set. A map of the participating wells is provided in the appendix as 
Figure A.3.  
The URNRD also provided a dataset identifying the owner(s) and operator(s) of 
each field with certified irrigation acres. Also provided was the District’s key to matching 
the DNR well IDs to the field IDs used within their datasets. When reconciled, the final 
dataset contained 3,179 unique field IDs and their owner/operator information for the 
certified acres in 2011. The final dataset provided by the URNRD is a large file tracking 
historical use from 1980 to 2012 for 3,346 unique field IDs. The file contains the annual 
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certified acres, crops planted, pool ID (if applicable), beginning allocation, and county 
ID.  
The remaining data was gathered from previous published works focusing on 
Nebraska and the Republican River Basin. Precipitation data used is from Schlenker and 
Roberts (2009).  
Price and quantity values used to generate the marginal abatement cost, MAC, 
indicators were generated by Palazzo and Brozovic (2012). The model utilized well-
characteristic data available through the Nebraska DNR and results from the use of the 
Water Optimizer program developed at University of Nebraska-Lincoln (Martin, Supalla, 
McMullen, & Nedved, 2007). The initial abatement cost points were calculated as the 
difference in the well’s profits under unconstrained and constrained pumping. Each point 
in the MAC curve is determined by calculating the change in the profit associated with 
increasing the stringency of the pumping constraint. To determine the value of the MAC 
indicator used, the relationship of the curves was modeled, as shown in Figure 1. In the 
figure below, Well A is shown in red while Well B is shown in blue. To determine the 
direction of trade predicted by the MAC curves for these two wells, the quantity was set 
at two inches—or equal to the average transfer size in the district. For example, at two 
inches of water abated, the cost or price of abatement calculated by mentally calculating 
the integral is lower (~$0/year) for Well A than Well B (~$9.00/year). This indicates that 
cutting back water use is less expensive for Well A and it would be a net seller to Well B, 
where reducing allocations is more expensive.
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Figure 3.1 Marginal Abatement Cost Curve Plot for Formal Trade 3. 
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The stream depletion factor is not a deciding factor in the approval under the 
current trading rules; however the URNRD understands the importance of the measure on 
maintaining compact compliance and are seeking to add the requirement in the near 
future.  The variable was included in the models to test if producers were already 
considering stream depletion as a motivator for trade participation. Research in hydrology 
has shed light on the potential negative impact of groundwater pumping on nearby 
streams through the process of stream depletion. The hydrology models show that due to 
the diffusion properties of groundwater movement, flow impacts from pumping further 
from a stream will take longer than closer wells. This indicates that over a finite time 
period, wells closer to the stream will have a greater impact on flow by removing more 
water that those wells farther away, indicating that marginal damage of groundwater 
pumping varies over space (Glover and Balmer, 1954; Kuwayama & Brozovic, In Press). 
Kuwayama and Brozovic utilized the time path of stream depletion caused by a 
unit for groundwater pumping by a specified well to define a transfer function that 
expresses the stream depletion factor, SDF, as a proportion of the volume of water that 
was pumped by the wells in the past. The function can be considered a density function 
that ranges from 0 to 1 that characterizes how the lagged effect of pumping in one year is 
distributed across future years.  The distance between the well and the stream and other 
physical characteristics of the well determine the shape of the function with respect to 
time. Using standard hydrology assumptions, they created a linear weighted sum of 
pumping for a specific well for years preceding the one of interest and then aggregated 
the sum of stream depletion caused by individual wells. The structure of the aggregation 
allows for the assumption that the externality of pumping from one well is independent of 
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the externality caused by pumping at other wells. Due to the seasonality of groundwater 
pumping and the assumption that the stream flow is replenished every year by 
precipitation and snowmelt, the dynamic optimization problem indicates that the stream 
depletion externality does impact stream flow as opposed to stream stock, which is the 
measurement of concern for the Compact compliance at the Nebraska-Kansas border 
(Kuwayama & Brozovic, In Press). 
3.1 Owner/Operator Descriptive Statistics 
According the owner/operator information provided by the URNRD, there are 
524 unique operators in the district who manage the 3,179 fields. The average number of 
fields per operator is 6.05 fields, with a maximum of 94 fields and minimum of one field. 
There are 144 unique operators managing just one field. This large number of single field 
operators causes the distribution of fields among operators to be skewed to the left, with 
nearly 53% of the operators managing three fields or less. 
Examining the unique owner data, 731 different individuals or entities were 
identified as owning the 3,179 fields in the district. The average number of fields per 
unique owner is 4.35 fields, with a maximum of 94 fields and minimum of one field.  
There are 217 unique owners that own just one field. Again, having a large portion of the 
owners owning one field, the distribution of ownership is skewed to the left, with over 
64% of the owners claiming three fields or less. 
We find differences between the average values in the URNRD and in those 
operators who participate in formal trades, which are permanent transfers of water. 
Among the 49 unique operators who participated in formal trades, the average number of 
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fields is 14.27 fields per operator. Even with omitting the largest operator,
1
 the average 
number of fields among operators participating in trades is 13.31 fields, over twice as 
large as the district average. This indicates that larger operations are more likely to 
participate in the trade process. A similar pattern emerged when examining the 52 unique 
owners participating in formal trades. The calculation of the average number of fields per 
unique owner that participated in formal trades resulted in an average of 9.52 fields, or 
2.18 times larger than the district average.  
Also of interest is the participation in pooling of fields, or the informal trade of 
water between fields. Pooling is defined as the low transaction cost and informal version 
of trades, as it is much easier to get a pooling application approved through the District 
Council than a formal trade. Pooling is also viewed as a temporary trade as it only 
considers one year at a time, and the original certified acre allocation for each field 
remains the same after the pool is dissolved.  
Using the historical usage data provided by the district, 1,974 fields were 
identified as participating in pools during 2005-2007 and 1,914 during 2008-2012. Due to 
a change in the pool naming convention that made it difficult to track the history of the 
pools to those that existed before the name change, the decision was made to use only the 
pools in the two recent allocation periods in this analysis. Among unique operators, 53% 
participated in the pooling process while 50% of the unique owners participated in pools. 
Of the unique operators participating in pools, 83% of the total fields were pooled, 
leaving the remaining 17% of fields un-pooled. Slightly higher percentages, 90%, of 
fields owned by unique parties participating in pools were actually enrolled in pools. This 
                                                          
1
 There is one large operator in the URNRD who manages 60 fields. This is an anomaly in the district as the 
next largest operation has 49 fields.  
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indicates that although about half of the operators and owners have at least one field 
pooled, not every field under their management is pooled. 
An interesting result that emerged shows that 37 of the 49 (76%) unique operators 
who participated in trades have participated in pools. A similar result was found for the 
unique owners, where 36 of the 52 (69%) owners who participated in a trade had also 
pooled their fields. This leads to the hypothesis that there is demand for formal trading, 
but current rules and procedures are limiting the participation level. 
3.2 Usage Trends 
Examining usage trends within each county and the aggregate district was a way 
to study whether the current allocation restrictions were binding. Table 3.1 shows the 
given allocations for the 1980-2012 allocation periods. 
Table 3.1 URNRD Irrigation Allocation Levels. 
Years Allocation (inches/certified acre) 
1980-1983 22.0 
1984-1987 20 flood, 16 pivot 
1988-1992 15.0 
1993-2004 14.5 
2005-2007 13.5 
2007-2012 13.0 
 
The Table 3.2 outlines the average usage for those fields that were used for crop 
production from 1980-2012. We separated those fields that were in production for the 
entire period and those that came into production later to examine whether there are 
measureable differences in the characteristics of the two groups. For example, one could 
hypothesize that fields brought into production later are of lower quality, and that this 
may affect irrigation water demand. Those fields that had been enrolled in conservation 
programs like the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) or the Conservation Reserve 
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Enhancement Program (CREP) were omitted, as we focused on those field that were used 
for crop production for the entire thirty-two years. On average, usage in any single year 
was below the allocation limit except during the exceptionally dry years of 2000, 2002 
and 2012, where the usage exceeded the allocation limit. However, over the respective 
allocation period, aggregate county usage did not exceed the limit. This implies that the 
counties and district as a whole have not experienced a binding allocation restriction. 
Looking at overall trends of usage plotted in Figure 3.2, usage appears to fluctuate 
around 11 inches from 1980-1999. From 2000-2003 the average usage jumped up 
significantly; however, this is primarily due to drought conditions in two of the four 
years. Between 2004 and 2011, the usage showed a distinct downward trend—well below 
the allocation restriction—with a significant spike in usage in 2012, again the result of 
drought conditions. 
In Figure 3.3, the precipitation data for 1980-2010 for the three counties was 
plotted against the district usage on the same graph to examine the relationship between 
usage and precipitation events in the district. It was clear that precipitation fluctuations 
are negatively correlated to the average usage. A simple regression revealed that 
precipitation, specifically what was recorded between May and August, explained 
approximately 74% of the variation in aggregate district usage.  
 The remaining fields that were used for crop production during the period of 
1980-2012 but not for the entirety were also examined to see if usage varied for these 
fields. The records of fields enrolled in CRP or CREP were omitted for only those years 
enrolled. Table 3.2 contains the usage averages for the three counties and the aggregate 
district level.  
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Table 3.2 Average Usage for Fields Used in Crop Production Every Year from 1980-
2012, Excluding Those Enrolled in CREP or CRP. 
Year Dundy Chase Perkins District 
1980 12.93 13.2 10.49 12.19 
1981 12.26 12.4 9.03 11.24 
1982 10.84 10.0 7.40 9.40 
1983 11.12 12.2 9.78 11.02 
1984 15.03 14.4 12.14 13.84 
1985 15.75 15.3 12.85 14.65 
1986 13.73 12.1 10.32 12.05 
1987 11.86 11.5 9.58 10.98 
1988 13.18 13.2 10.78 12.40 
1989 13.84 12.0 10.61 12.16 
1990 15.08 15.1 11.86 14.01 
1991 13.04 13.0 11.65 12.55 
1992 10.73 9.8 7.48 9.34 
1993 7.73 6.0 5.80 6.52 
1994 14.87 13.0 12.21 13.35 
1995 13.41 11.6 10.74 11.92 
1996 10.16 9.1 6.71 8.66 
1997 16.38 13.3 10.34 13.33 
1998 16.41 13.5 10.72 13.55 
1999 11.42 9.3 8.53 9.75 
2000 18.73 17.6 16.50 17.62 
2001 14.82 12.8 12.26 13.28 
2002 19.95 18.4 16.57 18.31 
2003 15.56 15.4 14.24 15.06 
2004 13.05 12.7 11.87 12.53 
2005 11.64 11.9 11.38 11.64 
2006 13.32 13.1 13.32 13.26 
2007 11.65 11.4 9.88 10.98 
2008 13.01 11.5 11.61 12.03 
2009 10.55 8.5 9.33 9.47 
2010 11.97 10.4 9.97 10.78 
2011 11.43 9.5 9.33 10.08 
2012 17.68 19.9 18.53 18.71 
Average 13.43 12.52 11.02 12.32 
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Figure 3.2 District Average Use and Allocation Limits.  
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Figure 3.3 District Average Annual Precipitation and Average Annual Water Usage.   
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Table 3.3 Average Usage for Fields Used in Crop Production for Less Than Thirty Years 
During 1980-2012, Excluding Those Enrolled in CREP or CRP. 
Year Dundy Chase Perkins District 
1980           9.90          12.87          13.57          12.11  
1981           8.68          12.11            8.93            9.91  
1982           8.65            9.38            7.11            8.38  
1983         10.61          11.78            8.10          10.16  
1984         14.35          15.02          10.74          13.37  
1985         14.81          14.97          11.82          13.87  
1986         13.47          11.11            8.84          11.14  
1987           9.77          10.09            8.21            9.36  
1988         12.18          11.79            9.62          11.20  
1989         12.49          11.48          10.55          11.51  
1990         13.27          14.74          11.27          13.09  
1991         11.95          12.64          11.04          11.88  
1992         10.73            9.67            6.33            8.91  
1993           8.21            5.82            5.02            6.35  
1994         15.32          12.70          12.01          13.34  
1995         12.95          11.30          11.39          11.88  
1996         10.41            8.61            6.47            8.50  
1997         16.40          12.59          10.26          13.08  
1998         15.44          12.76          10.56          12.92  
1999         10.21            8.67            8.58            9.15  
2000         16.78          17.75          16.77          17.10  
2001         13.35          12.73          13.23          13.10  
2002         17.69          17.99          17.73          17.80  
2003         13.45          14.10          14.80          14.12  
2004         11.84          12.50          12.53          12.29  
2005           9.85          11.22          10.81          10.62  
2006         12.21          12.60          13.36          12.72  
2007         10.01          10.87          10.10          10.33  
2008         12.22          11.39          11.91          11.84  
2009           9.88            8.31            9.98            9.39  
2010           9.98          10.10            9.07            9.72  
2011           8.67            7.44            8.29            8.13  
2012         13.90          15.50          17.58          15.66  
Average         12.11          11.86          10.81          11.60  
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The usage trends for those fields used for crop production the entire 30 years 
exhibit a higher usage rate than those fields that are not used the entire time. However, as 
shown in Figure 3.4, the usage pattern is similar. When T-tests were performed, it was 
determined that for the aggregate district, Chase and Dundy counties, the difference in 
usage were significantly different from zero but that the general usage pattern is similar 
between the two usage groups. The T-test performed on Perkins County concluded that 
there is no significant difference between the average usage for fields employed for the 
full 30 years and those fields that were not.
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Figure 3.4 Comparison of Usage in URNRD. 
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3.3 Methodology 
The sample was used to create six different models to examine formal permanent 
trade participation, informal temporary trade participation for the two most recent 
allocation periods, a formal trade direction model, and two informal trade direction 
models for the two recent allocation periods. The entire sample of fields used for 
irrigation was used to create a permanent trade participation model. The informal trade 
participation models used the same sample, with those fields participating in single field 
pools reclassified as those not participating in informal trading. The trade direction 
models used subsets of the full sample of only those who participated to predict the 
probability of being a buyer or seller in the trade relationship.  The decision to use two 
models for informal trade participation and direction, respectively, was motivated by a 
change in the pool naming convention (begun in 2005) that made it difficult to track 
pools further back, and by the change in allocation limits in 2008, which triggered the 
dissolution and reformation of pools generating multiple observations for one field.  The 
variables used in the various models are summarized in Table 3.4, which includes the 
variable’s name, definition, and unit of measure.  
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Table 3.4 Definitions of Variables. 
Dependent Variable Name Definition 
Trade  = 1 if participated in a trade 
Seller  = 1 if a seller 
 
Independent Variable Name Definition 
Acres field size in certified irrigation acres 
GPM pumping rate in gallons per minute at the time of 
drilling 
PWL the distance from the soil surface to the water level 
during pumping, measured in feet at the time of 
drilling 
Useavg07 field average water use from the first year of use until 
2007, in inches 
Percorn07 percentage of years field was in corn production from 
the first year until 2007 
Useavg12 field average water use from the first year of use until 
2012, in inches 
Percorn12 percentage of years field was in corn production from 
the first year until 2012 
Ownop = 1 if the owner is also the operator 
Opsize total number of fields owned by the field owner 
Medium = 1 if soil is of medium soil type 
Coarse = 1 if soil if of coarse soil type 
Unksoil = 1 if soil if of unknown soil type 
Perkins = 1 if the field is in Perkins County 
Dundy = 1 if the field is in Dundy County 
Avgusetrade  field average water use from the first year of use until 
the year before trade occurred 
Percorntrade percentage of years field was in corn production from 
the first year until the year before trade occurred 
SDF ranges from 0 to 1; impact on stream flow as a 
proportion of the volume of water that was pumped 
by the wells in the past 
MAC = 1 if the modeled MAC curve relationship indicates 
a seller 
Tradesize size of the permanent trade, in acres transferred 
Transfersize size of the temporary trade within a pool, in inches 
MAC2 = 1 if the MAC curve relationship indicates a seller at 
2 inches abated  
Constr = 1 if the pool is constrained by allocation limit 
MAC2*constr interaction variable between MAC2 and constr 
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3.2.1 Variable Description 
 The dependent variable for the formal and informal trade-participation models is 
the decision to participate in a trade (Trade). This variable is a binary indicator that 
equals one if an individual field participates in a formal trade and zero if it did not 
participate in a trade. The formal and informal trade-direction models use the binary 
variable (Seller) to predict the probability of the field being a buyer or seller in the 
permanent trade. The variable equals one if the field is a seller and zero if the field is a 
buyer. 
The decision to use the following variables was motivated by previous research 
on irrigation technology adoption. Negri and Brooks (1990), as well as a technical 
bulletin published by the Agricultural Research Service of the USDA (1962), included 
many of the variables for which we had measurements, including acres irrigated, well 
depth, and soil type. They also included measurements of energy costs, precipitation and 
soil productivity. Many of these additional variables do not vary enough across the 
URNRD to be included directly in the models, but were used in the calculation of the 
MAC prices and quantities through the use of Water Optimizer.  
With a few exceptions, most of the variables are unique to a specific field. The 
size of the irrigated fields (acres) is unique to each field observation and is a continuous 
variable. Our expectation is that this variable will be a significant positive indicator of 
formal trade participation as the trades are permanent and alter the amount of land that 
can be irrigated by the participating wells. For the direction models, the sign is also 
expected to be positive since larger fields are likely to have excess acres that the current 
irrigation system cannot cover efficiently.  
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The well technical variables used in the participation models measure the 
pumping rate (gallons per minute) and the distance from the soil surface to the water 
surface during pumping (pumping water level), and are continuous variables. They are 
used to compare the cost of pumping and are similar to the technique applied by Negri 
and Brooks (1990). Our expectation is that when it becomes more expensive to pump, 
producers will look for ways of increasing their efficiency by participating in trades. 
Thus, pumping-rate effect is expected to be negative because if the pumping rate 
increases, it becomes less expensive to pump and less desirable to trade. When the 
pumping water level increases, the water must be moved a longer distance to the surface, 
becoming more expensive. The expectation of sign, therefore, is positive as the cost 
increases with increasing the pumping water level and encouraging participation in 
trades. 
Unique to this study is the availability of water usage records for over thirty years, 
which allows for the continuous variables for average use (useavg07, useavg12 and 
avgusetrade). The models use the appropriate usage measurement based on the time-
frame examined. We expect average use to be positively related to trade participation as 
those fields that use more are more likely to be reaching their allocation limits and are 
motivated to find ways to increase the efficiency of their production in the face of 
decreasing allocation allotments.  The sign of the average usage is expected to be 
negative for the trade direction models because fields that have higher average use are 
more likely to be constrained by the allocation limit and therefore are more likely to be a 
net buyer in the trade.  
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The percentage of corn grown (percorn07, percorn12, and percorntrade) is a 
measurement of crop type, which the technical bulletin (1962) identified as an important 
variable in determining irrigation adoption. The percentage of corn grown was calculated 
as the number of years corn was planted in the field divided by the number of years usage 
was recorded. This allows the variable to be continuous between zero and one. Our 
expectation of sign for the formal participation is negative because participants also 
includes sellers of water where corn production is less efficient and the producers seek to 
grow other crops that require less water, freeing up the allocation for sale. The sign for 
the informal trade participation is expected to be positive as those fields that grow water-
intense crops, like corn, are looking for ways to temporarily increase their water 
allowances to finish a crop. The sign is expected to be negative for the trade direction 
models, as those fields that grow more corn are likely to be net buyers of water due to the 
higher water needs of corn compared to beans or wheat. 
The land tenure indicator (ownop) is equal to one when the owner of the field is 
also the operator, based on the 2012 URNRD data. The sign of this variable in the 
participation models is expected to be positive as a land owner is more likely to take the 
time to participate because he can continue farming the field to recover the transaction 
cost, whereas a renter may not have the expectation of continuing to farm the field the 
next year. We expect a positive sign for the formal-direction models as rented land is less 
likely to be net sellers of water. When the operator is the same as the owner, the decision 
to sell is less complicated than when dealing with two decision makers that may have 
different goals. 
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The operation size (opsize) is unique for an entire operation and is based on data 
from 2012. Through the previous exploration of owner characteristics indicating that 
larger operations are more likely to participate in trades, the sign is expected to be 
positive for the participation models. The sign is expected to be negative for the formal-
trade direction models as the larger operations are more likely to be net buyers of water 
due to their increased access to capital. Due to URNRD regulations on pool formation, 
the operation size does not vary significantly and provides no inference power. 
The soil type indicators (medium, coarse, and unksoil) are binary variables that 
measure the soil’s ability to retain water after an irrigation cycle. We expect the medium 
and coarse variables to be positive based on farmer comments during visits to the 
URNRD. They noted that their goal was to increase efficiency of their operation by 
moving water from sandy or coarse soils to field that have better water retention. 
The county indicator variables (Perkins) and (Dundy) capture differences between 
the three counties in the URNRD.  The variables are included in the participation models 
only as the trade regulations restrict the movement of water beyond the floating township, 
creating little variation in the county within a trade.  These variables equal one when the 
field is in either Perkins or Dundy, respectively, and zero otherwise. Our expectation of 
the sign is negative because the majority of eligible fields for trade participation are 
located in Chase County, indicating that fields in Perkins or Dundy are less likely to 
participate given the current regulations on water movement.  
For the direction models, only the trade size (Tradesize and transfersize) is 
common to all fields that participate in a formal and an informal trade, respectively. In 
some cases this is only two fields (a buyer and seller), but in other cases multiple fields 
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have aggregated rights to trade a water allocation. We expect the sign to be negative as 
the MAC curves indicate that it is less expensive for fields to cut back a little than to cut 
back a large amount, indicating that smaller transfer sizes are sellers. 
The stream depletion factor (sdf) used in the formal trading model was calculated 
using the methods developed by Kuwayama and Brozovic (in press) and is continuous 
from zero to one. It measures the impact on stream flow as a proportion of the water that 
is pumped by wells in the past. Our expectation is a positive sign, indicating that water is 
moving away from high stream depletion wells to those that have less of an impact on 
stream flow. 
The marginal abatement cost indicators (MAC and MAC2) are used in the formal 
and informal trade direction models, respectively. These indicators use curves developed 
by Palazzo and Brozovic (2012) to determine how the curves would predict buying and 
selling behavior. The variable equals one when the curves predict a seller and zero if 
predict a buyer. We would then expect the sign to be positive, reflecting that the field 
behaves similarly to what theory expects. 
The final variables apply only to the informal trade direction models. The first is 
the indicator of constraint (constr), which equals one when the pool is constrained by the 
allocation limit and zero when it is not.  We would expect the sign to be positive because 
of the convex shape of the MAC curves within the typical transfer size. The final variable 
is an interaction variable between the MAC2 and constr, which is used to capture any 
differences when a pool is constrained since we decided to run one model for each period 
based on the evidence below. 
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3.2.2 Testing for Heterogeneity Among Pools 
 To examine the informal trading market created by the option to pool fields 
within a floating township, the dataset was divided to look at the pooling and usage in the 
last two allocation periods. The decision to use only the pools in the two recent allocation 
periods was due in part to a change in pool naming convention, which made it difficult to 
track the history of the pools to those that existed before the name change. The resulting 
datasets included field information for the 2005-2007 allocation of 13.5 inches per 
certified acre and the 2008-2012 allocation of 13 inches per certified acre. We divide the 
pools into two categories: constrained and unconstrained. The category is based on the 
average annual water use in all fields associated with the pool. The earlier dataset was 
divided at 13.4 inches to catch those pools that are close enough to the limit to be 
constrained, while the later dataset was divided at 12.9 inches for the same reasons.  
 Pooling fields is a tool producers can use to more efficiently allocate water among 
fields given the allocation restrictions. The allocation is aggregated across the fields and 
then can be applied at the producer’s discretion. As mentioned earlier in the introduction 
to the research area and exploration of the usage, most of the fields in the URNRD have 
significant amounts of carry-forward and thus are not fully constrained by the allocation 
limits. However, in a single allocation period, the pool may be constrained and use more 
than the aggregate allocations by drawing down on the participating fields’ carry-
forward. To look for any differences in characteristics between pools that were 
constrained and those that were not, summary statistics of for the two groups in each 
allocation period of study are listed Table 3.5 and Table 3.6. 
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 Table 3.5 Summary Statistics Comparing 2005-2007 Unconstrained and Constrained Pools.  
   
2005-2007 Unconstrained Constrained  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max T-value 
Field size 1420 154.830 59.624 0 640 552 158.421 76.056 0 640 1.108 
Gpm 1420 1489.419 741.642 25 3217 552 1663.670 824.357 150 9756 4.537**** 
Pwl 1422 129.061 68.829 15 440 552 117.948 59.878 25 750 3.335**** 
Average use 1422 12.203 2.766 -1.059 20.325 552 13.665 2.450 2.771 21.472 10.873**** 
Percentage corn 1422 0.726 0.199 0 0.968 552 0.745 0.180 0 0.968 1.970**** 
Ownop 1422 0.584 0.493 0 1 552 0.498 0.500 0 1 3.443**** 
Opsize 1422 15.342 20.195 1 94 552 17.830 21.067 1 94 2.426** 
Medium 1422 0.340 0.474 0 1 552 0.377 0.485 0 1 1.523 
Coarse 1422 0.351 0.477 0 1 552 0.397 0.490 0 1 1.900* 
Unksoil 1422 0.017 0.129 0 1 552 0.005 0.074 0 1 1.965** 
Transfersize 1422 2.065 2.013 0 13.335 552 2.262 2.534 0.004 21.378 1.802* 
Significance for Two Tailed Test of Differences in Mean Value   *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01, ****0.001 
4
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Table 3.6 Summary Statistics Comparing 2008-2012 Unconstrained and Constrained Pools.  
   
2008-2012 Unconstrained Constrained  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean     Std. Dev. Min Max T-value 
Field size 1665 156.571 66.124 0 640 247 153.355 59.142 0 640 0.723 
Gpm 1665 1543.728 782.472 25 9756 247 1517.632 683.115 585 3100 0.497 
Pwl 1667 126.742 64.848 15 440 247 119.267 74.708 25 750 1.656* 
Average use 1667 12.422 2.710 -1.059 20.957 247 13.627 2.621 4.405 21.472 6.548**** 
Percentage corn 1667 0.737 0.195 0 0.968 247 0.697 0.185 0.091 0.968 2.980*** 
Ownop 1667 0.569 0.495 0 1 247 0.547 0.499 0 1 0.655 
Opsize 1667 14.899 19.799 1 94 247 23.530 23.283 1 94 6.242**** 
Medium 1667 0.351 0.477 0 1 247 0.324 0.469 0 1 0.833 
Coarse 1667 0.342 0.474 0 1 247 0.522 0.501 0 1 5.534**** 
Unksoil 1667 0.014 0.119 0 1 247 0.008 0.090 0 1 0.798 
Transfersize 1667 1.991 2.085 0 22.527 247 2.393 2.752 0.002 19.266 2.699*** 
Significance for Two Tailed Test of Differences in Mean Value  *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01, ****0.001 
4
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In the ‘05-‘07 allocation period, 552 fields were members of a constrained pool 
while 1,422 were members of unconstrained pools. The well technical variables for 
pumping rate and pumping water level are significantly different, with a higher pumping 
rate and a smaller pumping water level for constrained pools. This is consistent with what 
one would expect because if the pumping rate is higher and the pumping water level is 
smaller, it is less expensive to pump more water and become constrained by the 
allocation limit. Unsurprisingly, average field use and percentage of years in corn are 
both significantly higher for those pools that are constrained. It was surprising to discover 
that land tenure and operation size were significantly different between the two groups. A 
constrained pool is more likely to be managed by a renter than an unconstrained pool, 
which is consistent with renter’s desire to irrigate the necessary amount to produce an 
adequate crop to cover the cost of production expenses and the added rental expense. A 
plausible explanation for the larger operation size for constrained pools may be that fields 
that are less efficient or more expensive to irrigate are likely to be sold off after a 
retirement or death and likely-buyers are often the larger producers that can pool these 
fields together with their existing fields in the area. Soil type was only slightly 
significantly different between the two groups, with coarse (sandy) soils more likely to be 
found in constrained pools, where the water retention rate of the soil is lower. Transfer 
size was only slightly significantly different, while average field size was not 
significantly different between constrained and unconstrained pools. 
 For the ‘08-‘12 allocation period, only 247 fields were members of a constrained 
pool, leaving 1,667 in unconstrained pools. Average field size between constrained and 
unconstrained pools proved to be insignificantly different. Unlike the previous allocation 
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period, the only well technical variable that was significantly different was pumping 
water level at the 10 percent level, indicating that those wells with higher water levels 
during pumping are more likely to be constrained by the allocation limit. Again the 
average use and percentage of years in corn is significantly higher for those pools that are 
constrained, which is consistent with planting a high water-need crop like irrigated corn. 
Land tenure is not significantly different in the most recent allocation period, but once 
again the constrained pools often belong to larger operation sizes. When comparing soil 
types against fine (clay) soil, only the coarse soil indicator was significantly different 
between the two groups, indicating more fields of coarse soil type were found in 
constrained pools.  The T-value for average transfer size within the pool proved to be 
significantly different, with larger transfers occurring in constrained pools consistent with 
greater average use by the fields.  
 The models for the direction of trade for the temporary trades proved to be more 
challenging due to the informal nature of the trades.  Examining the average use of the 
pools, it became clear that a portion of the pools were constrained by the allocation 
allotment. To examine whether pools that were unconstrained behaved like those who 
were constrained, the data was split into two groups to test the coefficients.  
 However, testing differences in coefficients across binary probit models is not as 
straight forward linear regressions and must be approached with caution.  This difference 
is mainly due to binary regression coefficients being infused with residual variation in the 
form of unobserved heterogeneity. These differences in residual variation can produce 
differences between model coefficients that are not indications of true differences in 
causal effects.  In his paper, Allison (1999) provides a way of testing if the variation in 
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coefficients is due to residual variation and a way of correcting if it is suspected. The first 
step is to create a table of coefficient ratios and test them for significant differences. If 
there appears to be a pattern in which one group is consistently higher or lower than in 
the other group, it is an indication of a potential problem that may be resolved by 
adjusting for the residual variation. The tables below contain the coefficients, ratios, and 
chi-squared test of difference with one degree of freedom for each of the models.  
This test was completed for two versions of the model for each allocation period. 
The first set of results, shown in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 respectively, use field-level 
technical measurements for pumping rates and pumping water level.  For both the ‘05-‘07 
and ‘08-‘12 models, none of the coefficients are significantly different at the five-percent 
significance level. In the ‘05-‘07 models the pumping rate is significantly different at the 
ten-percent level, but for the purpose of this analysis the five-percent cut-off was used for 
evaluation decisions.  
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Table 3.7 Test of Difference in Coefficients for Pumping Rates and Pumping Water 
Levels in 2005-2007. 
 Unconstrained Constrained   
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Ratio of 
Coefficients 
Chi-Squared for 
Difference 
Acres 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.594 0.152 
useavg07 -0.198 0.016 -0.242 0.028 -7.124 1.899 
percorn07 0.109 0.191 0.513 0.321 0.340 1.168 
Ownop -0.016 0.073 0.078 0.117 -0.138 0.471 
Medium -0.202 0.091 -0.184 -0.206 0.156 0.006 
Coarse 0.056 0.091 -0.203 -0.241 0.158 1.015 
Unksoil 0.071 0.309 - - - - 
Transfersize 0.011 0.019 0.000 0.027 0.418 0.125 
Pwl -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -1.615 0.050 
Gpm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.285 2.742* 
_cons 2.655 0.272 3.494 0.508 5.229 2.117 
Significance level: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. The constrained model contained no observations for unksoil. 
 
Table 3.8 Test of Difference in Coefficients for Pumping Rates and Pumping Water 
Levels in 2008-2012. 
 Unconstrained Constrained  
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Ratio of 
Coefficients 
Chi-Squared for 
Difference 
acres 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.291 0.016 
useavg12 -0.246 0.016 -0.237 0.044 -5.550 0.038 
percorn12 0.095 0.191 0.153 0.552 0.173 0.010 
ownop 0.085 0.068 0.229 0.179 0.475 0.565 
medium -0.114 0.084 -0.007 0.283 -0.403 0.132 
coarse -0.029 0.085 0.209 0.272 -0.107 0.700 
unksoil 0.315 0.332 0.737 1.033 0.305 0.151 
transfersize12 0.007 0.016 -0.020 0.043 0.155 0.338 
pwl -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -1.458 0.003 
gpm 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.961 2.641 
_cons 2.997 0.268 3.262 0.825 3.635 0.093 
Significance level: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
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The second set of models uses an indicator variable, MAC2, for the MAC curve 
prediction at the quantity level of two inches of abatement, and the coefficient and chi-
squared test results are shown in Table 3.9 and Table 3.10. Again, neither the ‘05-‘07 nor 
‘08-‘12 models showed a significant difference at the five-percent significance level. The 
lack of ratio patterns and significant differences indicate that there is not a problem with 
residual variation and that the dataset of constrained and unconstrained pools may be 
combined for one model in each allocation period. Observing the lack of significant 
difference in the coefficients across constrained and unconstrained pools, one model was 
used for each allocation period. Descriptive statistics for the variables in each of the six 
final models are listed in the Table 3.11.
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Table 3.9 Test of Difference in Coefficients Test for MAC2 in 2005-2007. 
 Unconstrained Constrained   
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Ratio of 
Coefficients 
Chi-Squared for 
Difference 
acres 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.847 0.346 
useavg07 -0.176 0.015 -0.226 0.026 -6.741 2.828* 
 
percorn07 0.007 0.184 0.447 0.316 0.023 1.451 
ownop -0.065 0.071 0.056 0.116 -0.561 0.785 
medium -0.181 0.088 -0.187 0.155 -1.167 0.001 
coarse 0.033 0.095 -0.092 0.160 0.209 0.453 
unksoil -0.040 0.295 - - - - 
transfersize 0.015 0.019 -0.001 0.027 0.547 0.227 
MAC2 -0.015 0.078 0.219 0.131 -0.111 2.333 
_cons 2.134 0.240 2.801 0.435 4.903 1.804 
Significance level: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. The constrained model contained no observations for unksoil. 
 
Table 3.10 Test of Difference in Coefficients Test for MAC2 in 2008-2012. 
 Unconstrained Constrained  
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Ratio of 
Coefficients 
Chi-Squared 
for Difference 
acres 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.528 0.003 
useavg12  -0.217 0.015 -0.208 0.040 -5.482 0.049 
percorn12  -0.002 0.185 -0.045 0.538 -0.003 0.006 
ownop  0.012 0.067 0.196 0.176 0.067 0.953 
medium  -0.104 0.082 0.064 0.284 -0.367 0.325 
coarse  0.007 0.089 0.294 0.269 0.027 1.024 
unksoil  0.209 0.311 0.016 0.903 0.231 0.041 
transfersize12  0.008 0.016 -0.019 0.042 0.187 0.351 
MAC2  0.115 0.073 0.064 0.189 0.607 0.063 
_cons  2.543 0.239 2.475 0.707 3.598 0.008 
Significance level: *10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
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Table 3.11 Descriptive Statistics.  
 Formal Trade 
Participation 
‘05-‘07 Informal 
Trade Participation 
‘08-‘12 Informal 
Trade Participation 
Formal Trade 
Direction 
‘05-‘07 Informal 
Trade Direction 
‘08-‘12 Informal Trade 
Direction 
Variables n= 3179 n= 3119 n= 3122 n= 100 n= 1974 n= 1914 
Continuous  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
acres 155.966 67.194 155.469 66.320 155.470 66.330 167.439 76.301 155.835 64.646 156.155 65.259 
gpm 1512.162 757.449 1508.731 756.953 1508.672 756.879 1489.140 711.857 1538.196 769.472 1540.356 770.243 
pwl 136.192 73.506 136.511 73.518 136.504 73.535 113.473 57.704 125.953 66.620 125.778 66.229 
opsize 13.383 18.519 13.461 18.600 13.460 18.594 14.030 13.841 16.038 20.467 16.013 20.481 
useavg12 12.008 2.976 - - 12.007 2.985 - - - - 12.706 2.709 
percorn12 0.743 0.220 - - 0.743 0.220 - - - - 0.761 0.196 
useavg07 - - 12.061 3.139 - - - - 12.808 2.860 - - 
percorn07 - - 0.725 0.233 - - - - 0.746 0.207 - - 
avgusetrade - - - - - - 11.363 4.360 - - - - 
percorntrade - - - - - - 0.642 0.263 - - - - 
SDF - - - - - - 0.583 0.234 - - - - 
Tradesize - - - - - - 34.759 37.547 - - - - 
transfersize - - - - - - - - 2.120 2.172 2.060 2.297 
Binary =1 Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
ownop 1,812 57 1,778 57.01 1,782 57.08 53 53 1,105 55.98 1,083 56.58 
medium 1,069 33.63 1,048 33.6 1,050 33.63 46 46 692 35.06 665 34.74 
coarse 1,007 31.68 991 31.77 992 31.77 21 21 718 36.37 699 36.52 
unksoil 50 1.57 49 1.57 49 1.57 - - 27 1.37 26 1.36 
Perkins 913 28.72 908 29.11 907 29.05 - - - - - - 
Dundy 909 28.59 887 28.44 889 28.48 - - - - - - 
MAC - - - - - - 45 45 - - - - 
MAC2 - - - - - - - - 1,009 51.11 977 51.04 
constr - - - - - - - - 552 27.96 247 12.9 
4
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3.3.3 Probit Model Estimation 
The use of binary or limited response variable models, such as probit and logit, 
have grown in popularity for modeling choice behaviors similar to groundwater trading— 
such as irrigation and rainwater harvesting adoption (He, Cao, & Li, 2007)—and for 
determining irrigation technology choice (Negri & Brooks, 1990). Probit models were 
selected as the best-fitting models to show the factors that affect the likelihood of 
participating in a formal and informal trade as well as to predict the direction of trade 
between participants. The response variables for each model are binary variables equal to 
one or zero. A probit model is of the form: 
(1) P (y = 1|x) = G(β0 + β1x1 + … + βkxk) = G(β0 + xβ) 
Where G is a standard normal cumulative distribution function taking on values strictly 
between zero and one: 0<G (z) <1 for all real numbers z (Wooldridge, 2003). This 
functional form of G (z) requires that estimated response probabilities of the model are 
strictly between zero and one and will not result in a negative probability or a probability 
greater than one. For the general probit model, as well as those used here, a standard 
normal distribution for the error term, ε, is assumed. The model estimations and tests are 
all done in the STATA software package. 
The resulting sign of the coefficients in each model can be interpreted as the 
individual influence of each explanatory variable on the response probability of the 
model, ceteris paribus.  The statistical significance of each variable is determined by 
whether we can reject H0: Bj =0 at a sufficiently small significance level. To find the 
magnitude of effect of a one unit change in an explanatory variable, holding all other 
variables fixed, the marginal effect of that change is of the form:  
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(2) G[β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + … +βk(ck +1)] – G(β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + … +βkck) 
There are two widely accepted measures of goodness-of-fit for binary response 
models discussed in econometric literature. The first is known as the percent correctly 
predicted. This method first estimates the probability that the predicted value (ŷi) takes on 
the value of one for each i. The predicted probabilities must then be converted to binary 
values of one or zero for comparison with the observed values (yi).  A pitfall of this 
measure is that it is possible to get high percentages of correctly predicted observations 
without the model being of much use when the sample contains a high proportion of one 
value to the other, which is why it is important to report the percent correctly predicted 
for each of the two outcomes (Wooldridge, 2003). 
The second measure of fit is the reported pseudo R-squared value for binary 
response. A pseudo R-squared is similar to the R-squared value for an OLS model, which 
is a measure of how closely ŷi is to yi. The value for the pseudo R-squared is not expected 
to be as high as a conventional OLS R-squared because it is unlikely that the predicted 
values of the probit model will be exactly one or zero; they are more likely to be found 
somewhere in between (Wooldridge, 2003). 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 Using STATA 12.1, each of the probit models was executed and the results are 
reported below. For each model, the sign of the coefficients were compared to 
expectations, marginal effects were interpreted, and the overall fit of the models were 
evaluated. 
4.1 Model 1: Formal Trade Participation 
The model applied to the formal trade participation for the permanent transfers of 
groundwater is as follows: 
 (3) P(Trade = 1) = G(α + β1*acres + β2* useavg12 + β3*percorn12 +  
β4* ownop + β5*opsize + β6* medium + β7*coarse + β8*unksoil+ 
β9*Perkins + β10*Dundy + β11*gpm + β12*pwl) 
 Due to only recent interest and rule allowances, 100 of the 3,179 observations 
have participated in trades, skewing the distribution severely to non-participation. The 
model results are presented in Table 4.1 and the marginal effects are presented in Table 
4.2. Although the number of observations for participating is very small, the model 
reveals results that are generally consistent with expected behavior. The variables with 
the highest levels of significance include the size of the field, the amount of corn grown, 
and the county location of the fields.  
 While the model indicates a high level of significance for the size of the field, the 
marginal effect is very small and designates that a one acre increase in field size increases 
the probability of participation by only 0.01%. This small marginal effect may be the 
result of the lack of variation in field size for those that did participate in formal trades. 
The positive sign implies that larger fields are more likely to participate in formal trades, 
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indicating that with the current time-intensive trading process, larger fields are more 
likely to benefit from the effort of participating in trades. 
 The percentage of years the field was in corn production is highly significant in 
the model, and the marginal effect indicates that increasing the variable by one percent 
decreases the probability of participating in a formal trade by 3.4%. This is consistent 
with expectations as participants include both buyers and sellers of water. Those fields 
where it is less efficient to produce corn, thus those field that grow it less often, are more 
likely to seek out a trade opportunity to get the benefits of their pumping rights since they 
are not being fully utilized under the current management practices. 
 The final significant variables are the county indicator variables for Perkins and 
Dundy counties. Both variables exhibit negative coefficients, and their marginal effects 
indicate that a Perkins County field is 2.8% less likely to participate and a Dundy County 
field is 2.4% less likely to participate, compared to a field located in Chase County. 
These results are as expected due to the high concentration of irrigated fields in Chase 
County and the current regulations restricting the distance water can be traded.   
 Evaluating the formal trade participation model has implications regarding the 
application of the trade direction model explained below. With the lack of participating 
field observation points, the model did not do a very good job of fitting the data—the 
pseudo R-squared value is 0.0634—and so caution must be used when applying the 
formal trade direction model to the entire district. The goodness-of-fit calculation reports 
that the model correctly predicted participation for 3,072 of the 3,179 of the observations 
or 96.6% but was unable to correctly identify any of the fields that actually participated in 
the formal trading process.   
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Table 4.1 Probit Regression Estimates and Standard Errors for Model 1. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z-Score 
Field size, acres 0.0015** 0.0006 2.46 
Average use through 2012 -0.0215 0.0169 -1.28 
Percentage of years planted to corn through 2012 -0.6022*** 0.2303 -2.62 
Owner = operator indicator -0.0412 0.0964 -0.43 
Operation size 0.0036 0.0030 1.23 
Medium soil type 0.1787 0.1142 1.57 
Coarse soil type -0.1014 0.1358 -0.75 
Unknown soil type 0.2786 0.3244 0.86 
Perkins -0.4853*** 0.1563 -3.11 
Dundy -0.4201*** 0.1266 -3.32 
Gallons per minute -0.0001 0.0001 -1.43 
Pumping water level -0.0012 0.0009 -1.36 
Constant -0.9857*** 0.2472 -3.99 
Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively 
 
Table 4.2 Marginal Effect Estimates for Model 1. 
Margins dy/dx Delta-method 
Standard Error 
Z-Score 
Field size, acres 0.0001** 0.0000 2.47 
Average use through 2012 -0.0012 0.0010 -1.27 
Percentage of years planted to corn through 2012 -0.0348*** 0.0132 -2.63 
Owner = operator indicator -0.0024 0.0056 -0.43 
Operation size 0.0002 0.0002 1.23 
Medium soil type 0.0103 0.0066 1.56 
Coarse soil type -0.0059 0.0078 -0.75 
Unknown soil type 0.0161 0.0188 0.86 
Perkins -0.0280*** 0.0087 -3.22 
Dundy -0.0243*** 0.0072 -3.35 
Gallons per minute 0.0000 0.0000 -1.43 
Pumping water level -0.0001 0.0000 -1.37 
Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively 
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4.2 Model 2: Informal Trade Participation 2005-2007 
The model applied to the informal trade participation for temporary transfers of 
groundwater during the 2005-2007 allocation period is as follows: 
(4) P(Trade = 1) = G(α + β1*acres + β2* useavg07 + β3*percorn07 + 
β4* ownop + β5*opsize + β6* medium + β7*coarse + β8*unksoil+ 
β9*Perkins + β10*Dundy + β11*gpm + β12*pwl) 
 Due to the comparative ease of creating an informal trade versus a formal trade, 
participation in the informal trading market is much more prolific, with 1,974 of the 
3,179 fields participating during the 2005-2007 allocation period. The model results are 
presented in Table 4.3 and the marginal effects are available in Table 4.4. The majority of 
the variables included in the model prove to be highly significant, which aligns with 
expected significance provided by previous literature on irrigation technology adoption 
and water trading. 
 The first significant variable included in the model is the measure of average use 
over the life of the field’s recorded use until 2007. The positive sign and marginal effect 
indicate that when the average use increases by one inch, the probability of participating 
in a pool increases by 4%. This result is consistent with expected producer behavior and 
with comments during interviews in which producers said that one of their major goals is 
to efficiently manage their water allocations. By participating in an informal trade within 
a pool, a producer is able to increase average use on more efficient fields by cutting back 
use on less efficient fields, where it may be more expensive to pump or less productive 
land. Given the current district rules resulting from the Compact settlement, if the 
producer’s goal is to increase average use, their options include participating in a 
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relatively easy-to-form pool or complete the more time-intensive formal trade process, 
which has proved to be a less popular management choice. 
 The size of the operation is highly significant when predicting informal trade 
participation. The marginal effects indicate that increasing the operation size by one field 
increases the probability of participating by 1.3%. Traditionally, most pools have been 
formed with one owner for all the participating fields, indicating that in order to form an 
efficient pool, an operation must have at minimum two fields. Restrictions on the 
distance water can be moved further restrict the access of pool formation for small 
operations that may have multiple fields but do not fulfill the distance limitation rules. 
Thus larger operations have greater opportunities to participate in informal trades. 
 Compared to fine soils, both medium and coarse soil-type fields are more likely to 
participate in informal trading. Their marginal effects indicate fields with medium soil-
types are 10.8% more likely to participate and fields with coarse soil-types are 13.2% 
more likely to participate than fields with fine soil-types.  Medium or coarse (sandy) soil-
types have poorer soil water retention rates than fields with fine soil, which may direct 
fields with the former soil-types to consider all management options for increasing water 
use efficiency, including participating in informal trading pools. 
 Similar to the formal trading model, the informal trading model shows that fields 
in Perkins and Dundy counties are less likely to participate. The marginal effects show 
that fields are 14% less likely to participate in informal trading if they are located in 
either Perkins or Dundy counties compared to Chase County. The negative coefficients 
are consistent with the fact that the majority of fields eligible for pooling are located in 
Chase County. 
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 The coefficient of pumping water levels exhibits a negative sign and is highly 
significant. The pumping water level measures the distance from the soil surface to the 
water surface during pumping. When this number increases by one foot, pumping 
become more expensive as it requires more energy to move the water over a greater 
distance. The marginal effect of the one foot increase indicates that the probability of 
participation decreases by 0.02%. This result was inconsistent with prior hypothesis, that 
producers with higher-expense wells would be looking for ways to increase efficiency of 
allocated water by moving the water to wells were it is less expensive to pump. This may 
indicate that other factors that influence cost of pumping—such as pumping rates, 
irrigation system types and weather patterns—have a greater influence on pumping 
decisions than the pumping water levels. 
 The fit of the informal trade participation model for the 2005-2007 allocation 
period is much better than the formal trade model presented earlier. The fit was aided by 
the larger number of participating observations and resulted in a pseudo R-squared of 
0.1075. The goodness-of-fit method calculated that the model correctly identified 2,187 
of the 3,179 observations or 68.8%. The model over-predicted the number of participants 
but did a much better job predicting participation than non-participation by 
misidentifying 269 participants and 732 non-participants. 
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Table 4.3 Probit Regression Estimates and Standard Errors for Model 2. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z-Score 
Field size, acres -0.0001 0.0004 -0.24 
Average use through 2007 0.1057*** 0.0097 10.93 
Percentage of years planted to corn through 2007 0.1605 0.1198 1.34 
Owner = operator indicator 0.0341 0.0518 0.66 
Operation size 0.0098*** 0.0018 5.59 
Medium soil type 0.2888*** 0.0622 4.64 
Coarse soil type 0.3535*** 0.0654 5.41 
Unknown soil type 0.3328 0.2097 1.59 
Perkins -0.3728*** 0.0704 -5.29 
Dundy -0.3724*** 0.0670 -5.56 
Gallons per minute -0.0001 0.0000 -1.42 
Pumping water level -0.0007* 0.0004 -1.77 
Constant -1.0058*** 0.1465 -6.86 
Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively 
 
Table 4.4 Marginal Effect Estimates for Model 2. 
Margins dy/dx Delta-method 
Standard Error 
Z-Score 
Field size, acres 0.0000 0.0001 -0.24 
Average use through 2007 0.0397*** 0.0036 10.94 
Percentage of years planted to corn through 2007 0.0603 0.0450 1.34 
Owner = operator indicator 0.0128 0.0195 0.66 
Operation size 0.0037*** 0.0007 5.6 
Medium soil type 0.1085*** 0.0234 4.64 
Coarse soil type 0.1328*** 0.0246 5.4 
Unknown soil type 0.1250 0.0788 1.59 
Perkins -0.1400*** 0.0265 -5.29 
Dundy -0.1399*** 0.0251 -5.56 
Gallons per minute 0.0000 0.0000 -1.42 
Pumping water level -0.0003* 0.0002 -1.77 
Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively 
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4.3 Model 3: Informal Trade Participation 2008-2012 
The model applied to the informal trade participation for temporary transfers of 
groundwater during the 2008-2012 allocation period is as follows: 
(5) P(Trade = 1) = G(α + β1*acres + β2* useavg12 + β3*percorn12 +  
β4* ownop + β5*opsize + β6* medium + β7*coarse + β8*unksoil+ 
β9*Perkins + β10*Dundy + β11*gpm + β12*pwl) 
 Similar to the previous allocation period, the participation in informal trading is 
more common than the participation in formal trades. During the most recent allocation 
period, 1,914 of the 3,179 observations participated in pools. The model results are 
displayed in Table 4.5, and the marginal effects are available in Table 4.6. The model 
exhibits similar results of coefficient signs and significance as the previous allocation 
period model.  
 The most significant variables include the field’s average groundwater use, 
operation size, soil type, location in the district, and pumping water level. Although the 
two periods were separated to account for the change in allocation limits, the sign, 
significance, and magnitude of the marginal effects are similar to the earlier model and 
allow for the same conclusions to be drawn. 
The marginal effect of increasing average use by one inch indicates a 3.9% 
increase in the probability of participating in an informal trade. Adding an additional field 
to an operation shows a marginal effect of a 0.34% increase in the probability of 
participating, a smaller impact than the previous model’s 1% increase. Having either 
medium or coarse soil instead of fine soil demonstrates a marginal effect of increasing the 
probability of participating by 10.4% and 13.6%, respectively. Due to the concentration 
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of irrigated fields in Chase County, the marginal effect of having a field in either Perkins 
or Dundy County decreases the probability of participating by 14% and 17.6% 
respectively. The final highly significant variable was the well technical variable of 
pumping water level. When the distance of pumping increases by one foot, the marginal 
effect indicates 0.04% decrease in the probability of participating in informal trading, 
which again is similar to the model for the previous allocation period. 
Other variables just missing the standard 10% level of significance cut-off include 
the percentage of years in corn production, the land tenure indicator, and the technical 
measure of pumping rates. When a field increases the percentage of years in corn by one 
percent, the marginal effect indicates an increase in participation probability by 7.4%. 
This is consistent with the expectation that producers are making management decisions 
that help them increase efficiency, such as creating pools, when producing water-
intensive crops like corn.  
When the land is owned and operated by the same producer, the marginal effects 
indicate an increase in participation probability of 3%.  This is consistent with 
expectations that operators are more likely to file the paperwork and form a pool when 
they are also the land owner. It is difficult for a renter, who may not be managing the 
farm the following year, to realize the full benefits of forming a pool, and thus they are 
less likely to incur the time cost of applying for the pool formation.  
The final variable of slight significance is the pumping rate measure, and it has 
the expected negative sign. When a field increases its pumping rate by one gallon per 
minute, the probability of participating in a pool decreases by 0.002%. Although the 
marginal effect is very small, the positive sign is consistent with expectations that fields 
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with higher pumping rates are less likely to participate in pools because they are able to 
efficiently pump the needed amount of water from the single well. 
 Evaluating the fit of the informal trade participation models will help determine if 
the directional model can be applied across the entire district or only to small portions of 
the district. The pseudo R-squared value for the most recent allocation period is 0.099, 
slightly lower than the model for the previous allocation period. The goodness-of-fit 
returned similar results as the previous model by correctly identifying 2,140 of the 3,179 
observations or 67.3%. Once again the model over-predicted participation but did a better 
job of predicting participation than non-participation by misidentifying 323 participants 
and 716 non-participants. 
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Table 4.5 Probit Regression Estimates and Standard Errors for Model 3. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z-Score 
Field size, acres 0.0000 0.0004 0.12 
Average use through 2012 0.1019*** 0.0099 10.26 
Percentage of years planted to corn through 2012 0.1933 0.1254 1.54 
Owner = operator indicator 0.0784 0.0513 1.53 
Operation size 0.0088*** 0.0017 5.21 
Medium soil type 0.2726*** 0.0616 4.42 
Coarse soil type 0.3562*** 0.0648 5.5 
Unknown soil type 0.2364 0.2025 1.17 
Perkins -0.3671*** 0.0698 -5.26 
Dundy -0.4587*** 0.0663 -6.92 
Gallons per minute -0.0001 0.0000 -1.6 
Pumping water level -0.0011*** 0.0004 -2.74 
Constant -0.9850*** 0.1492 -6.6 
Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively 
 
Table 4.6 Marginal Effect Estimates for Model 3. 
Margins dy/dx Delta-method 
Standard Error 
Z-Score 
Field size, acres 0.0000 0.0001 0.12 
Average use through 2012 0.0390*** 0.0038 10.27 
Percentage of years planted to corn through 2012 0.0740 0.0480 1.54 
Owner = operator indicator 0.0300 0.0197 1.53 
Operation size 0.0034*** 0.0006 5.22 
Medium soil type 0.1044*** 0.0236 4.42 
Coarse soil type 0.1364*** 0.0248 5.49 
Unknown soil type 0.0905 0.0776 1.17 
Perkins -0.1406*** 0.0267 -5.26 
Dundy -0.1756*** 0.0254 -6.92 
Gallons per minute 0.0000 0.0000 -1.6 
Pumping water level -0.0004*** 0.0002 -2.74 
Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively 
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4.4 Comparison of Model 2 and Model 3 
The dataset was split into the two allocation period groups to account for the 
change in allocation limit, new rules that caused the dissolution of existing pools, and the 
general dissolution and formation of new pools that occurred at the start of the new 
allocation period. The dissolution of pools made it difficult to combine the datasets into 
one for a single model as the field would have two observations for examining 
participation. Adding to the difficulty was the formation of new pools with participants 
from recently dissolved pools. These created two observations for the field, as the 
average pool usage, transfer size, and even direction in some cases changed, ultimately 
preventing the combination of the datasets for the two allocations for a single model.  
 Despite the need for two models, the results for the two periods are very similar. 
The ratio of coefficients and chi-squared test of difference indicate no significant 
difference in the model’s coefficients. Most of the ratios are close to one, indicating 
nearly identical coefficients. The chi-squared tests with one degree of freedom also show 
no significant difference as all the test statistic values are less than 0.5. The coefficients, 
the ratio and test statistics are found in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7 Test of Difference in Coefficients for Model 2 and Model 3.  
 2005-2007 2008-2012  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error Ratio of Coefficients Chi-Squared for 
Difference 
Field size, acres -0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 -2.03 0.06 
Average use  0.1057 0.0097 0.1019 0.0099 1.04 0.07 
Percentage of years planted to corn 0.1605 0.1198 0.1933 0.1254 0.83 0.04 
Owner = operator indicator 0.0341 0.0518 0.0784 0.0513 0.43 0.37 
Operation size 0.0098 0.0018 0.0088 0.0017 1.11 0.17 
Medium soil type 0.2888 0.0622 0.2726 0.0616 1.06 0.03 
Coarse soil type 0.3535 0.0654 0.3562 0.0648 0.99 0.00 
Unknown soil type 0.3328 0.2097 0.2364 0.2025 1.41 0.11 
Perkins -0.3728 0.0704 -0.3671 0.0698 1.02 0.00 
Dundy -0.3724 0.0670 -0.4587 0.0663 0.81 0.84 
Gallons per minute -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.91 0.01 
Pumping water level -0.0007 0.0004 -0.0011 0.0004 0.65 0.46 
Constant -1.0058 0.1465 -0.9850 0.1492 1.02 0.01 
Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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4.5 Model 4: Formal Trade Direction 
The model applied to the formal trade direction for the permanent transfers of 
groundwater is as follows: 
(6) P(Seller = 1) = G(α + β1*acres + β2* avgusetrade + β3*percorntrade + 
β4* ownop + β5*opsize + β6* medium + β7*coarse + β8*tradesize+ 
β9*MAC + β10*sdf ) 
 Of the 100 fields that have participated in permanent trades, 46 were net sellers of 
water and 54 were net buyers of water. The model results are summarized in Table 4.8 
and the marginal effects can be found in Table 4.9. The model utilizes those variables 
that vary on the field level and are consistent with irrigation adoption literature and 
anecdotal interviews with the producers in the research area. 
 The model reveals that the most significant factors in determining the direction of 
trade for permanent transactions are the average field size, the field’s average use until 
the time of the trade, and the MAC prediction of the relationship. Although the field size 
is statistically significant, the marginal effect is relatively small and indicates that 
increasing the field size by one acre increases the probability of being a seller by 0.19%. 
The positive sign of the effect is consistent with expectations as fields with more certified 
acres have potentially more excess certified acre allocations available to sell.  Larger 
fields are also less likely to be buyers due to the pivot irrigation limitations of existing 
technology employed in the area. 
 The significance level of average field use up to the time of trading is the highest 
of the model and exhibits the expected negative sign. The variable captures the use-
history prior to the trade and indicates that fields with higher average use are less likely to 
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be sellers of water, which is consistent with expectations. When average usage increases 
by one inch, the marginal effect decreases the probability of being a seller by 6.5%.  
 The final significant variable is the MAC indicator variable, which was created by 
examining the curve relationships within the convex portion of the curves of the fields 
involved. The ability of the MAC to accurately identify a field’s role in the trading 
scheme helps to validate its mathematical calculation and appropriateness for predicting 
permanent trade possibilities in the research area. When the MAC variable predicts a 
seller, the marginal effect indicates an increase in the probability of being seller by 
30.8%. 
 Although the stream depletion factor is not highly statistically significant, it 
exhibits the expected sign and has a large positive marginal impact. When the sdf 
increases by 0.01, the marginal effect indicates that the field is 29.2% more likely to be a 
seller of water. This is great news for the URNRD water managers as it indicates that the 
pumping is moving away from areas where pumping has a larger impact on stream flow 
and is helping the district stay in compliance with the Compact. 
 This model performs the best of the six and is highly correct in predicting the 
direction of permanent formal trades according to the two measure of evaluation. The 
pseudo R-squared for this model is 0.2656, which is the highest among the three trade 
direction models. The goodness-of-fit method also resulted in the correct prediction of 75 
of the 100 observations, or 75%. Of those predicted accurately, 33 or 44% were net 
sellers and 42 or 56% were net buyers. 
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Table 4.8 Probit Regression Estimates and Standard Errors for Model 4. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z-Score 
Field size, acres 0.0049** 0.0022 2.18 
Average use until trade -0.1658*** 0.0509 -3.26 
Percentage of years planted to corn until trade 0.8372 0.7649 1.09 
Owner = operator indicator -0.0587 0.3213 -0.18 
Operation size -0.0112 0.0139 -0.8 
Medium soil type -0.1077 0.3325 -0.32 
Coarse soil type 0.0135 0.5036 0.03 
Trade size -0.0053 0.0042 -1.28 
MAC indicator 0.7815** 0.3256 2.4 
Stream depletion factor 0.7418 0.6644 1.12 
Constant 0.0044 0.8579 0.01 
Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively 
 
Table 4.9 Marginal Effect Estimates for Model 4. 
Margins dy/dx Delta-method 
Standard Error 
Z-Score 
Field size, acres 0.0019** 0.0009 2.18 
Average use until trade -0.0654*** 0.0201 -3.26 
Percentage of years planted to corn until trade 0.3299 0.3007 1.1 
Owner = operator indicator -0.0231 0.1266 -0.18 
Operation size -0.0044 0.0055 -0.81 
Medium soil type -0.0425 0.1310 -0.32 
Coarse soil type 0.0053 0.1985 0.03 
Trade size -0.0021 0.0016 -1.28 
MAC 0.3080** 0.1287 2.39 
Stream depletion factor 0.2923 0.2612 1.12 
Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively 
 
  
68 
 
 
4.6 Model 5: Informal Trade Direction 2005-2007 
The model applied to the informal trade direction for the 2005-2007 allocation period 
pools is as follows: 
(7) P(Seller = 1) = G(α + β1*acres + β2* useavg07 + β3*percorn07 +  
β4*medium + β5* coarse + β6* unksoil + β7* transfersize + β8* MAC2 + 
β9* constr + β10*(MAC2*Constr) ) 
 For those fields that participated in pools during the ‘05-‘07 allocation period, 995 
transferred water to 979 recipients. The results of the above model are shown in Table 
4.10 and the marginal effects are presented in Table 4.11.  The model focuses on those 
variables that are unique to the field to better model the decision process faced by the 
producer.  Operation size and land tenure were not included due to the fact that most 
trades occurred within one operation under the same land tenure situation and therefore 
did not provide useful information on trading behavior. 
 The most statistically significant factors in predicting the probability of a seller 
are the field’s average use, if the field has medium soil type, whether the pool is 
constrained, and the interaction variable. The negative sign of the average use coefficient 
is consistent with the hypothesis that fields that use more water are less likely to be net 
sellers of water. Examining the marginal effect indicates that when average use increases 
by one inch, the probability of being a seller decreases by approximately 7.5%. 
 When interpreting the significance of the medium soil-type variable, it is 
important to recognize that the variable as an indicator variable and the set of soil type 
variables are compared to the fine soil type. When a field is of medium soil type as 
opposed to fine, the marginal effect shows the probability of being a seller decreases by 
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7.3% due to the negative sign of the coefficient. This indicates that fields with medium 
soils are more likely to be net buyers of water, which may be tied to the productivity of 
corn production on medium soil types.  Even though the variable is not statistically 
significant, the positive sign on the coarse variable is consistent with anecdotal evidence 
from farmer interviews that fields with sandy soils are likely to be sellers.  
 When the pool is constrained, the probability of the field being a seller is 
significantly higher—regardless of the MAC2 prediction—which is consistent with 
expected producer behavior when facing convex marginal abatement cost curves.  Over 
the average transfer size for the allocation period of approximately 2.12 inches, the MAC 
curves are convex, which leads to the conclusion that it is less expensive for multiple 
fields to cut back a little than to have one field cut back a significant amount. Plotting 
several MAC curves for the dataset also revealed than many fields experience zero cost 
for cutting back one inch or less. The constrained variable margins indicate that when the 
MAC2 indicates a buyer, the field is 6.0% more likely to be a seller when the pool is 
constrained. However, when the pool is constrained and the MAC2 predicts a seller, the 
field is 16.6% more likely to be a seller. The positive marginal effects, regardless of 
MAC2 prediction, indicate that producers, although showing consistent behavior with the 
curve shape, focus on different factors when making trade decisions in the informal trade 
market. This is a potential result of the temporary timeframe used for decision-making, 
unlike making a permanent sale or purchase.  Although the sign of the MAC2 coefficient 
is inconsistent with what was expected when the pool is not constrained, the variable is 
not significant at any reasonable level. The marginal effect of MAC2 when the pool is 
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constrained is significant and results in a field being 9.1% more likely to be a seller, 
which is once again consistent with the convexity of the curves. 
 To evaluate the overall fit of the model, the pseudo R-squared measure was 
examined and the goodness-of-fit method was applied.  The pseudo R-squared for the 
model is 0.1018. Even with a relatively low pseudo R-squared value, the model was able 
to correctly identify buyers and sellers for 1,314 of the 1,974 observations or 66.6%. Of 
those correctly predicted, 50.9% were predicted to be sellers and 49.1% were predicted to 
be buyers, which are consistent with the data sample percentage of sellers and buyers.  
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Table 4.10 Probit Regression Estimates and Standard Errors for Model 5. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z-Score 
Field size, acres 0.0004 0.0005 0.91 
Average use through 2007 -0.1875*** 0.0126 -14.91 
Percentage of years planted to corn through 2007 0.1386 0.1582 0.88 
Medium soil type -0.1834** 0.0765 -2.4 
Coarse soil type -0.0054 0.0808 -0.07 
Unknown soil type -0.2085 0.2747 -0.76 
Transfer size 0.0078 0.0152 0.51 
MAC2 indicator -0.0427 0.0760 -0.56 
Constrained indicator 0.1687* 0.0963 1.75 
MAC2*Constrained interaction 0.3058** 0.1325 2.31 
Constant 2.2243*** 0.2023 10.99 
Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively 
 
Table 4.11 Marginal Effect Estimates for Model 5. 
Margins dy/dx Delta-method 
Standard Error 
Z-Score 
Field size, acres 0.0002 0.0002 0.91 
Average use through 2007 -0.0748*** 0.0050 -14.92 
Percentage of years planted to corn through 2007 0.0553 0.0631 0.88 
Medium soil type -0.0731** 0.0305 -2.4 
Coarse soil type -0.0022 0.0322 -0.07 
Unknown soil type -0.0832 0.1096 -0.76 
Transfer size 0.0031 0.0061 0.51 
MAC2 at    
constrained = 0 -0.0151 0.0268 -0.56 
constrained = 1 0.0912** 0.0405 2.25 
Constrained at    
MAC2 = 0 0.0598* 0.0339 1.76 
MAC2 = 1 0.1660*** 0.0316 5.26 
Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively 
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4.7 Model 6: Informal Trade Direction 2008-2012 
The model applied to the informal trade direction for the 2008-2012 allocation 
period pools is as follows: 
(8) P(Seller = 1) = G(α + β1*acres + β2* useavg07 + β3*percorn07 +  
β4*medium + β5* coarse + β6* unksoil + β7* transfersize + β8* MAC2 + 
β9* constr + β10*(MAC2*Constr) ) 
For those fields that participated in pools during the ‘08-‘12 allocation period, 945 
transferred water to 969 recipients. The results of the above model are shown in Table 
4.12 and the marginal effects are presented in Table 4.13.  The model focused on those 
variables that are unique to the field to better model the decision process faced by the 
producer.  
 The variables of greatest significance are average field use, the MAC2 indicator, 
the constrained pool indicator and their interaction term.  Similar to the model for the 
previous allocation period, fields with higher average use over the five years are less 
likely to be net sellers of water. The marginal effects indicate that when average use 
increases by one inch, the field is 8.6% less likely to be a net seller of water. 
 Similar to Model 5, the constrained indicator variable is statistically significant 
and positive regardless of the MAC2 prediction. Again, producers are faced with convex 
abatement cost curves and realize that is it less costly to cut back a little from many fields 
than to cut back a large amount from one field. The constrained variable margins indicate 
that when the MAC2 indicates a buyer, the field is 10.6% more likely to be a seller. 
However, when the MAC2 predicts a seller, the field is 7.3% more likely to be a seller. 
Although showing consistent behavior with the curve shape, it appears that producers 
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focus on different aspects when making trade decisions in the informal trade market, 
which may be due to the temporary timeframe used for decision-making.  The positive 
sign of the MAC2 coefficient is consistent with what was expected when the pool is 
constrained, but the variable is not significant at any reasonable level.  The marginal 
effect of MAC2 indicating a seller when the pool is unconstrained is significant and 
results in a field being 4.3% more likely to be a seller. 
 The lack of significance of the other variables in either allocation period trade 
model indicates that the MAC curves—calculated using well specific characteristics, 
production costs and average weather conditions—are better suited for predicting the 
probability of being a seller or buyer in the informal market. 
Evaluating the overall fit of the model was done using the pseudo R-squared 
measure and the goodness-of-fit method. The pseudo R-squared for the model is 0.1197, 
which is slightly higher than the model for 2005-2007. The goodness-of-fit evaluation 
determined that the model correctly predicted 1,276 of the 1,914 observations or 66.7%. 
Of those correctly predicted, 47.3% were predicted to be sellers and 52.7% were 
predicted to be buyers, which is consistent with the data sample percentage of sellers and 
buyers.  
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Table 4.12 Probit Regression Estimates and Standard Errors for Model 6. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Z-Score 
Field size, acres 0.0008 0.0005 1.60 
Average use through 2012 -0.2152*** 0.0137 -15.69 
Percentage of years planted to corn through 2012 -0.0059 0.1739 -0.03 
Medium soil type -0.0887 0.0780 -1.14 
Coarse soil type 0.0437 0.0829 0.53 
Unknown soil type 0.1923 0.2920 0.66 
Transfer size 0.0057 0.0150 0.38 
MAC2 indicator 0.1253* 0.0721 1.74 
Constrained indicator 0.3066** 0.1291 2.37 
MAC2*Constrained interaction -0.0970 0.1797 -0.54 
Constant 2.5101*** 0.2212 11.35 
Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively 
 
Table 4.13 Marginal Effect Estimates for Model 6. 
Margins dy/dx Delta-method 
Standard Error 
Z-Score 
Field size, acres 0.0003 0.0002 1.6 
Average use through 2012 -0.0859*** 0.0055 -15.69 
Percentage of years planted to corn through 2012 -0.0024 0.0694 -0.03 
Medium soil type -0.0354 0.0311 -1.14 
Coarse soil type 0.0174 0.0331 0.53 
Unknown soil type 0.0767 0.1165 0.66 
Transfer size 0.0023 0.0060 0.38 
MAC2 at    
constrained = 0 0.0435* 0.0250 1.74 
constrained = 1 0.0097 0.0584 0.17 
Constrained at    
MAC2 = 0 0.1063** 0.0442 2.4 
MAC2 = 1 0.0725* 0.0441 1.65 
Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively 
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4.8 Comparison of Model 5 and Model 6 
The argument for two models for informal trade direction is strongest for 
determining the probability of buying or selling water. The models rely on variables that 
that differ for some fields due to dissolution and formation of new pools such as transfer 
size and the MAC2 relationship of the fields involved. The change in allocation limit in 
2008 directly impacted the constrained indicator variable and the interaction variable, 
both of which are statistically significant in the models. 
 Even with the need for two models, the results are generally consistent between 
the models and lead to the same discussion and conclusions. The ratio of coefficients test 
show much more variation in the coefficients and sign than the comparison of the 
participation models. The coefficient for percentage of years in corn changed 
significantly between the two periods, going from fairly large and positive to slightly less 
than zero. The MAC2 indicator coefficient changed from insignificant and negative to 
significant and positive, further demonstrating the need for two models. According to the 
chi-squared test of difference, the only significant difference was for the coefficient of the 
interaction variable at the 10% level, indicating similar behavior between the two 
allocation periods. The significance of the interaction variable coefficients is due largely 
to the difference in the MAC2 coefficients that barely miss the significance level cut-off 
for one degree of freedom. The results of the coefficient ration and chi-squared test are 
found in Table 4.14.
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Table 4.14 Test of Difference in Coefficients for Model 5 and Model 6.  
 2005-2007 2008-2012  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error Ratio of Coefficients Chi-Squared for 
Difference 
Field size, acres 0.0004 0.0005 0.0008 0.0005 0.57 0.24 
Average use  -0.1875 0.0126 -0.2152 0.0137 0.87 2.22 
Percentage of years planted to corn  0.1386 0.1582 -0.0059 0.1739 -23.33 0.38 
Medium soil type -0.1834 0.0765 -0.0887 0.0780 2.07 0.75 
Coarse soil type -0.0054 0.0808 0.0437 0.0829 -0.12 0.18 
Unknown soil type -0.2085 0.2747 0.1923 0.2920 -1.08 1.00 
Transfer size 0.0078 0.0152 0.0057 0.0150 1.37 0.01 
MAC2 indicator -0.0427 0.0760 0.1253 0.0721 -0.34 2.57 
Constrained indicator 0.1687 0.0963 0.3066 0.1291 0.55 0.73 
MAC2*Constrained interaction 0.3058 0.1325 -0.0970 0.1797 -3.15 3.25* 
Constant 2.2243 0.2023 2.5101 0.2212 0.89 0.91 
Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 Water trading literature states that there are significant economic gains to be 
achieved by moving water from areas of low efficiency to areas of higher efficiency 
within a region. This study utilized probit models and marginal effects analysis of factors 
that help predict the probability of participating in formal and informal trades, as well as 
the direction of trade among participants, in an effort to achieve the aforementioned 
economic gains and to better predict the impacts of groundwater pumping. The 
participation models used field-level variables and provided insight into the participation 
decision process. The trade direction models relied on some of the same factors as 
participation, but also those factors that are unique to the field and the trade it participated 
in. The results of the model support our previous trading behavior hypothesis and can be 
used to guide ex-ante evaluation of groundwater trading in other regions. 
 The focus on the trade participation models is crucial for determining if it is 
appropriate to apply the direction of trade models to the entire district or only 
subsections. For example, can the models be applied to operations of all sizes? The 
results of the participation models indicate that operation size has a positive marginal 
effect and is significant for informal trade participation. This indicates that larger 
operations are more likely to participate in trading, but the significance may be 
exaggerated and is in fact an artifact of the rules set forth by the URNRD to restrict the 
distance water is moved.  Overall, the participation models do not indicate that separate 
models are needed and that the general participation models can be applied to the entire 
district.  
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 A major constraint to the formal trade participation is limited data on formal 
participation in trades and results in low accuracy model. However, the large 
participation in informal trades is an indicator that there is, in fact, substantial interest in 
trading water but that there are currently barriers preventing more formal trading. Once a 
pool is formed, the marginal cost of trading water is effectively zero, whereas the 
marginal cost of formal trading under the current process is significantly higher. The 
large participation in informal trading is a sign of potential economic gains for the 
District from reducing the transaction costs associated with formal trading. If the 
marginal cost of participating in a formal trade were reduced—through the aid of an 
online trading platform to find potential trading partners, for example—participation in 
formal trades would be expected to increase substantially.  
Expanding the formal trading market to include annual use trades (leases of 
water) in addition to the permanent trades also has the potential to open the market and 
allow for more observations for the formal participation model. The ranking of the MAC 
curves are not stationary under different precipitation and crop price scenarios, indicating 
that buyers and sellers may switch roles under different production situations. The ability 
for buyers and sellers to switch roles, as predicted by their MAC relationship, indicates 
that annual leases would provide an additional risk management tool for producers by 
generating flexibility in the field’s annual allocation. 
 The trade direction models’ results perform the best and provide insight into 
producer behavior and decision-making when it comes to water management in water-
short areas. The models indicate that for both formal and informal trading producers 
behave rationally and generally as expected. By improving the accuracy of trade direction 
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probability, the models for pumping impacts are also improved and are able to more 
accurately predict the direct and indirect effects of groundwater pumping for irrigation. 
 Caution must be taken before applying similar models to other areas because field 
or well level usage data is critical as it is a significant variable in nearly every model. As 
explained in much of the literature on water markets, there are specific components that 
must be fulfilled before a water market can exist. These include the installation of meters 
to record usage (at least annual records of usage), explicit water rights, and enforcement 
of restrictions. Once these requirements for a groundwater trading market are met, the 
collection of usage information needed for these models becomes much easier. 
 The MAC curves are a critical component of the trade direction models and did a 
good job in helping predict the probability of being a buyer or seller of water. If designed 
appropriately for the different regions, the curves and MAC indicators can be used to 
predict direction and ultimately the impacts of groundwater trading in an area. The Water 
Optimizer program, a key factor in the generation of the MAC values, can be used to 
model any area of Nebraska, and with slight modification, can be applied to other regions 
outside Nebraska.  
 For the URNRD specifically, the large positive marginal effect of the stream 
depletion factor indicates that formal trading does align with their policy goal of reducing 
the negative impact on stream flow in the Republican River by groundwater pumping in 
the District. The marginal effect shows that water is moving from wells that have a large 
impact on the stream flow (as a percentage of their pumping) to wells that have lower 
impact on the stream flow. Relaxing the rules on formal trades and increasing 
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participation with lower transaction costs may still be consistent with URNRD goals and 
more economically desirable. 
 This research is one of the first to empirically study groundwater trading and 
provide model results. The results from this research can be used ex-ante to prepare 
similar models for other areas, include using data from the other Republican River NRDs 
and expanding to other water-short regions. The main obstacle for application of this 
research is the lack of usage measurements that will take time to gather as more and more 
regions are looking to apply meters and enforce restrictions.  
Future plans to improve the URNRD models include the generation of more 
refined measures of relative soil type and other characteristics to separate average 
characteristics from field characteristics so as to capture more detailed differences at the 
field level. Creating and conducting a survey of producers would provide additional 
information about factors that influence the decision-making process, such as education 
levels, operation structure, and other field characteristics (such as productivity). A major 
goal of improving this study for future journal publications includes attempting a 
matching technique for the formal participation model to generate a higher accuracy 
model than the current method applied. Testing for selection between informal and 
formal trades will allow for further insight into the behavioral decision of trade 
participation. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1 Map of Republican River Watershed. 
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Figure A.2 Map of Upper Republican Natural Resource District. 
8
5
 
86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.3 Map of Wells Participating in Formal Trades. 
